

## **Interventions Implemented By State and Civil Society in Post Conflict Reconstruction in Kibera and Mathare, Nairobi Kenya after 2007/8 PEV**

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**Abstract:** *The reconstruction of a broken social and human fabric in a war shattered region has to be geared toward promoting human well-being and social justice, which constitute positive peace. Social empowerment and trust building improve the chances of successful reconstruction. In order to create a sustainable structure for peace, agreements among key stakeholders, leaders and politicians have to reflect the needs and interests of community groups and have to be supported by them. This paper evaluates the intervention programs implemented by the state and civil society towards post conflict reconstruction in Kibera and Mathare slums after the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya. Methodologically, the study utilized secondary sources with major emphasis on primary data collection.*

**Keywords:** *Civil Society, Conflict, post -conflict reconstruction, peace, State*

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### **I. Introduction**

The recovery of a fractured community increases its ability to change the dynamics of the cycle of conflict. Peace building ultimately has to focus on problems attributed to original and new sources of serious conflict. Conflict not only destroys buildings but it also affects trust, hope, identity, family, and relationships. The use of post conflict peace building and conflict transformation requires a wide range of actors.

Post conflict reconstruction calls for concerted energies from all stakeholders to ensure success particularly, civil society organizations complementing the capacity of the conflict-ridden governments. The government on the other hand must ensure that it creates the enabling environment for civil society groups to thrive. Civil society organizations cover a wide range of organizations that are not for profit, and they include; Non-Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations and Faith Based Organizations. Civil Society Organizations have different orientations in terms of the activities they take on.

The post conflict reconstruction programs include; Reconciliation programs, psycho-social support, counseling programs, food distribution, rebuilding of destroyed structures, provision of temporary shelter, security, social amenities, resettlements of the affected individuals, and the development of peace committees to reconcile the warring groups.

Commenting on the intervention programs in Rwanda after the genocide, Smock (1999) points out that post conflict reconstruction initiatives fostered an appropriate environment for building communal trust in post-genocide context as well as social and economic reintegration. It also results in the development of infrastructure projects (rebuilding roads and schools, electricity), income-generating projects, and capacity building (World Bank, 1999). Such productive, non-political engagement has the potential to gradually encourage conflicting groups to accept one another as members of the same community and restore communication between them, promoting coexistence indirectly and gradually to normalcy.

### **II. Research Methodology**

#### **2.1 Research Design**

The research design for this study was an exploratory comparative design that was undertaken within the study period of 2013-2015. This design was selected essentially in order to draw comparisons between two selected divisions. Further comparisons and interventions were undertaken by CSOs and State in both divisions coupled with challenges experienced.

## 2.2 The Area of Study

The study area was Kibera and Mathare slums as it was considered the hot spots of 2007/8 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya. Muchiri (2010) maintains that they are the largest, most populated and poorest slums in East and Central Africa at large. Kibera and Mathare slums are characterized by lack of basic services and infrastructure such as adequate access to water, sanitation, garbage collection, roads and footpaths, drainage, electricity and public lighting. Housing units are semi-permanent in nature. Social amenities are inadequate, with facilities such as schools and hospitals unable to cope with the population demand (Lang'ata District Development Plan, (2002-2008).

## 2.3 Study Population.

According to 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Kibera and Mathare division had a population of 533, 484 (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 453,175 (243,038 male) and (210 137 female) in Kibera occupying 232.488 area –sq km and 80,309 (44,098 male) and (36,620 female) in Mathare occupying 0.08837 area –sq km respectively.

The study specifically targeted the following population; 45, 939 household heads, 442 Government officials, and 117 Civil Society Organizations. The Government officials targeted included; 41 Village elders, 10 chiefs, 10 Members of county assembly (MCAs), 377 security officers, 4 Assistant Sub-County Commissioners, and 2 Assistant County Commissioners as shown in Table 2.1

**Table 2.1 Number of sampled categories of the government (state) officials**

State	Kibera		Mathare	
	Total Population	Sample size	Total Population	Sample size
Village elders	27	27	14	14
Sub-County Commissioner (DC)	1	1	1	1
Assistant Sub county commissioner(DO)	2	2	2	2
Security officers	200	20	177	18
Chiefs	4	4	6	6
MCA's	4	4	6	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>47</b>

Source (Records from Assistant County Commissioner's office, 2014)

On the other hand, the targeted population in relation to civil society organizations included; 59 Non-Governmental Organizations staff, 36 Community Based Organizations (CBOs) staff, and 22 Faith-Based Organizations as shown in Table 2.2.

**Table 2.2 Number of the population and sampled categories of the CSO's**

	Kibera		Mathare	
	Total Population	Sample size	Total Population	Sample size
NGO's	33	10	26	8
CBO's	23	7	13	4
FBO's	13	4	9	3
Total	69	21	48	15

Source (Records from Assistant County Commissioner's office, 2014)

## 2.4 Sampling Strategy and Sample Size

This research drew a sample following the recommendation of Kombo and Tromp (2006) of 10% to 30% to be a representative for a study population. While (Kalin 2006) recommended a 20% to 30% as ideal to represent a target population under study.

### 2.4.1 Sample Distribution of the Household heads

The sample distribution of the household heads was categorized along the demarcated administrative units in the two divisions (Kibera and Mathare). A list of the entire house hold respondents per village was availed from the Deputy county commissioner's office out of which Mugenda and Mugenda (2006) proportional formula was applied to come up with an all-inclusive and representative household heads sample size. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), the sample size from a larger population can be determined by the formula:

$$S = \frac{N(CV^2)}{CV^2 + (N - 1)e^2}$$

Where:

S = Desired sample

N = Population

CV = Coefficient of variation (set at 0.1)

e = Tolerance at desired level of confidence (set at 0.5 at 95% confidence level).

Substitution of the constituents in the relationship is done as follows:

S = 45,939 (0.01)

= 459.39 (Household heads)

From the study population of 45,939 household heads for both divisions, with 18,127 households in Kibera and 27,812 household heads in Mathare, a sample size of 181 household heads respondents from Kibera and 278 households from Mathare was picked to get a grand total of 459 household heads respondents.

#### **2.4.2 Sample Distribution of state officials**

The study employed various sampling techniques to get respondents in this category. Census procedure was used on Sub County Commissioners, Deputy Sub County Commissioners and Members of the county assembly. Purposive random sampling was used on obtaining the sample on village elders, and chiefs. In Kibera, the sample population frame entailed; 27 village elders, 4 chiefs, 200 security officers, 1 assistant sub county commissioner, 1 sub county commissioner, and 4 Members of County Assemblies (MCAs). On the other hand, the sample frame in Mathare included; 14 village elders, 4 chiefs, 177 security officers, 1 assistant sub county commissioner, 1 sub county commissioner, and 6 MCAs (table 2.1 above)

#### **2.4.3 Sample Distribution of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Staff**

There are several Civil Society organizations operating in Kibera and Mathare divisions. Their numbers were obtained from the National Council of NGOs through the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. However, preference was given to CSOs that were directly involved in PCR after 2007/8 PEV in Kenya. Similarly, Mugenda and Mugenda's formula was applied for this category. In Kibera sample population frame for civil society entailed; 10 NGOs, 7 CBOs and 4 FBOs while in Mathare were 8 NGOs, 4 CBOs, and 3 FBOs (see table 2.2 above).

#### **2.5 Data Collection**

In this study, triangulation method which is the use of different methods to obtain different but complementary data on the same topic was more appropriate. Primary data was collected through the questionnaires, interview schedules, FGD guides and observation check list. While secondary data was collected through document and content analysis guide to ascertain an in-depth analysis on the implementation of post conflict reconstruction programs. The combination of data collection tools was selected to enable the investigator have an in-depth understanding of the nature and extent of the problem.

#### **2.6 Validity and Reliability of Data Instruments**

The researcher used content validity so as to ascertain whether the tools measured what was stated in the objectives. This was done through cross checking with the supervisors. This meant that the researcher's content validity measures contained all possible items that were used in measuring the concept. In this study, a valid measure of 0.5 was acceptable as in spearman correlation coefficient.

The researcher used test and retest techniques where the same data instrument was administered twice during the pilot study in Kawangware slum to the same respondents after a period of 2 weeks. After the research instrument had yielded the same results, the researcher went ahead and administered them to the selected samples in Kibera and Mathare slums.


### **III. Results and Discussion**

Data collected was gleaned, coded and analysed via Excel and SPSS and the results were as follows:-

#### **3.1 Interventions Implemented by the State**

Respondents across the four categories were requested to name some of the interventions undertaken by the state in the post conflict reconstruction in Kibera and Mathare after 2007/8 post election violence.

A summary of household heads responses on the implementation programs received from the government is as shown in Figure 3.1



**Figure 3.1 Intervention Programs Implemented by the State in Mathare and Kibera.**  
 Source: (Field Data, 2015)

The study also found out that while the government was applauded for the creation of jobs for the youth, majority within the FGDs felt that the government’s interventions were a double edged sword. They narrated that the immediate reaction involved the deployment of police to “fight fire with fire”. Though it was not effective in restoring order immediately, some residents admit police presence reduced theft, arson, vandalism and violence. However, according to Bashir (2006), in some areas police interventions left behind a trail of deaths, rape and beatings. This was confirmed through a sharing from one of the respondents:

“My daughter is a survivor of sexual abuse, she became pregnant and miscarried. We know the police officer who sexually assaulted her, but she has lost hope that she will find justice. She has undergone counseling which helped her to accept what happened. Although she has moved on she still suffers from nightmares of PEV recurrence once in a while (FGD 4 Women group Mathare 2014)”

The study’s findings concur with De Smedt, (2009) who noted that in Kibera and Mathare divisions, police shot hundreds of violent demonstrators, including a few in front of TV news cameras, causing more violence.

However, according to Okombo (2010), The Government of Kenya was at the forefront of responding to the challenge of post-election violence countrywide. Some initiatives enacted by the government include deployment of police to affected areas, encouragement and facilitation of community dialogue at grass root levels, launching of District Peace Committees, employment opportunities to youth (KaziKwaVijana) with a target of 700-750 youths in Kibera and Mathare, slum feeding programs and nation-wide resettlement program for IDPs, dialogue and cease fire, peace tournaments, road shows among others

The study findings showed that the implementation of intervention programs by the GoK in Kibera is depicted by the responses totaling 34% reconciliation programs, 12.3% employment opportunities, 67.1% counseling services, 33.3% resettlement of IDPs, 48.1% food distribution, 37.1% financial support, 32.4% peace building, 22.1% formulation of policies, and 39.1% setting up of peace committees.


On the other hand, the implementation programs provided by GoK in Mathare are depicted as 15.1% employment opportunities, 42.1% counseling programs, 32.3% resettlement of IDPs, 54.3% food distribution, 31.7% financial support, 41.5% peace building services, 33.2% formulation of policies, and 31.6% setting up of peace committees. The study established that in Kibera and Mathare, a road construction project, lighting and social amenities funded by the Italian government and World Bank in collaboration with the Government of Kenya was being implemented. During the interviews and focused group discussions, the researcher noted that the respondents across the four categories were of the opinion that these projects especially one that was undertaken by the National youth service (NYS) was a source of youth employment which has since reduced the criminal activities in the slums.

Civil society staff 16 (44%) acknowledged that the government played an important role in the creation of policies coupled with financing of post conflict reconstruction activities in the communities affected. This study agrees with these findings given that any post-conflict leadership needed to place the larger national

interest over and above that of the social or political group, presupposing the ability to successfully manage and resolve conflicts in an open, participatory and all-inclusive manner as cited by Okombo (2010).

### 3.2 Intervention Programs Implemented by Civil Society

Respondents across the four categories were further asked to evaluate some of the interventions programs implemented by the civil society organizations. A summary of their responses is as shown in Figure 3.2 below



**Figure 3.2 Intervention Programs provided by civil society in Kibera and Mathare**  
**Source: (Field data, 2015)**

After the end of 2007/8 Post election violence in Kenya, civil society organizations were observed to have entered into the hot zones to provide humanitarian assistance for those who were affected. In Kibera, 78.2% of the respondents ranked counseling as highest intervention program that was initiated by the civil society, 54% peace building activities, 34% food distribution and provision of shelter, 32.8% provision of financial support, 30.1% medical services, 28.1% rebuilding of destroyed structures, 27.2% employment opportunities, 22% reconciliation programs, and 21% prayers. The findings are supported by (Marshall, 2011) who points out that humanitarian assistance provided by the CSOs to the affected individuals are effective in delivering lifesaving assistance to internally displaced persons

Likewise, intervention programs implemented in Mathare is depicted from the percentage responses totaling 33.2% reconciliation programs, 17.2% employment opportunities, 62.1% counseling programs, 12.1% prayers from faith based organizations, 31.1% food distribution, 22.2% rebuilding of destroyed structures, 22.2% provision of temporary shelter, 29% provision of medical services, 17% peace building activities, and 17% provision of financial support. The interventions facilitated reconciliation among the affected members thus enhanced peaceful co-existence in Kibera and Mathare informal settlements.

During the interviews and focused group discussions, the researcher noted that the respondents across the categories were in agreement that Kibera had the highest rating of counseling, peace building and rebuilding of destroyed structures compared to Mathare. This according to the researcher, could have been contributed by the fact that Kibera residence felt aggrieved by claims of stolen votes from the then ruling party (PNU) hence warn many organization's sympathy. Kibera was the most hit by the violence since the demonstrations, looting, destruction of properties and burning down of churches, mosques and markets was rampant.

One of the key informants observed:

“After the PEV, many NGOs and FBOs came in to assist the affected individuals by providing food, shelter, and medicine. The organization near our homestead provided medical services alongside giving food and resettling the displaced group of people. On the other hand, it created employment to some of the affected people as a result of conflict, especially the youth and the women involved (Key informant State officer, 2014)”.

The findings showed that the role of civil society in post conflict reconstruction was vital since it provided humanitarian and development assistance to the victims. Pearson Chi-Square value ( $\chi^2_{16,0.01} = 43.382$ ) showed that there was highly significant ( $P < 0.01$ ) association between intervention

programs provided by the civil society in post-conflict reconstruction in Kibera and Mathare. During a focused group discussion, a participant noted:

“MSF –Belgium working in Kibera provided ARVs to the clients who had sought refuge at Jamuhuri camps while MSF-France working in Mathare followed its clients to Moi Airbase where IDPs from Mathare had sought refuge during and after 2007/8 PEV to give them ARVs, similarly Kenya Red Cross and AMREF supplied victims with shelter, utensils and the basics. Indeed, civil society brought in medical and counseling services to the people (FGD 2 Security officer, Mathare 2014)”.

As noted by Mue (2009), the most targeted ethnic group in Kibera were the Kikuyus who were perceived supporters of the ruling party (PNU) led by the then President Kibaki. While in Mathare, Luos were targeted because they were perceived supporters of the opposition party ODM under the leadership of Raila Odinga then. Hence, the intervention program directed to these individuals were those of preaching peaceful coexistence within the neighborhoods as was before no matter the ethnic background they came from.

#### **IV. Conclusions and Recommendations**

Analysis of the results shows that communities have benefited a lot from the interventions implemented by the state and civil society interventions after the 2007/8 Post election violence in Kibera and Mathare divisions Kenya. The study also revealed that there were duplications of interventions by civil society organizations and the state in both study areas which led to failure by the actors to effectively offer the services to the community members due to negative competition leading to waste of resources.

The study recommends that more emphasis should be placed on the collaborative networks between the state and civil society to avoid duplication of intervention efforts, and wastage of resources during post conflict reconstruction in conflict stricken environments.

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