The Impact of Migration on Internal Security: The Case of Itinerant Fulani Herdsmen In Ekiti State, South West Nigeria

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Abstract: *This paper interrogates the nexus between internal migration on the one hand, and ethnicity and internal security on the other. Relying on both primary and secondary sources of data, it seeks evidence for the relationships between internal migration and security in Nigeria by examining the various security implications of uncontrolled Fulani herdsman ship of cattle in South-West Nigeria, using Ekiti State as case study. The paper emphasizes the roles that public policy, community leadership and institutional action can play in streamlining relations between migrant groups and host communities in situations where government has not been directly involved in moderating relations between such groups of people. The paper then assesses the implications of this development for national unity, security and development. Finally, the paper makes recommendations for resolving the issues thrown up in the analysis.*
Key words: *Migration; migrant community;Internal Security; Itinerant Fulani Herdsman ship.*

I.   Introduction: The State And Security

The provision of security is one of the main duties of state (Almond, Powell, Strom and Dalton, 2004:4; Bressler, Friedrich, Karlesky, Stephenson (Jr), and Turner, 2002:5). Of the various theories of state, Thomas Hobbes' social contract theory advocate most strongly that governments as representatives of the state is best placed to provide security for the citizenry. Hence, government is imbued with power to ensure security as the sole authority that has legal monopoly of the instrumentality of coercion within a state. By this token, government controls not just the use of the instruments and every apparatus of state security, but also the institutions that are established to guarantee state protection and defence against both external aggression and internal insurrection. These institutions include the armed forces which comprise of the army, the navy and air force.

Security as a concept has been with man since the earliest of time. Therefore, it is a natural instinct of mankind. In simple terms, security has to do with self and group preservation, first from physical danger, and then from other forms of danger which may be economic, psychological, political, etc in nature. By the same token, security involves the prevention of damage or threat of damage to those things which one holds dear and which are seen as constitutive of the values and freedoms of man.

However, there is no generally accepted definition of security. Nnoli (2005:5) opines that the concept has been so mystified that it has "given rise to intellectual uncertainty, analytical confusion, paradigmatic disorder and theoretical impotence". For instance, Ojo (1991:1, cited in Ajayi 2007:438) defines security as "the preservation of the safety, freedom, values and welfare of the people as individuals and as groups". This is in tandem with the views of Nnoli (2006: vi) that security covers many aspects of the life of man, including human security, global security, environmental security and various other forms of security.

In this perspective, Sen (1999:127) attempts to capture economic, environmental and societal security with the concept of protective security as freedom that is instrumental to the attainment of development in its various ramifications. For instance, Buzan (1991) and Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) identified five forms of security, namely military, political, economic, environmental and societal security.

According to Almond, Powell, Strom and Datton (2004:4) and Nnoli (2006), security is bifurcated into internal and external security. External security implies protection against attacks from other political systems. As Nnoli argues, this is the established conception of national security in many African States whereas there are many other threats from within these countries that have more potential destabilizing effects than external threats (Nnoli, 2007:vi).

External security is conceived in terms of threat perceptions from outside a country that may be directed at attacking or destabilizing a state. To control such threats, national defence forces like the army, the air force and the navy are often created, funded, trained and deplored to protect the state and its people against external aggression on land, sea and air, respectively.

Internal security, on the other hand, implies protecting a state from threats to its peace, stability and progress of its people mainly from within. It includes protection against theft, aggression, and violence from members of one's own society (Almond, Powell, Strom and Dalton (2004:4). The need for internal security

reinforces the truism of the Biblical statement that 'a man's enemies are those of his own household'. Therefore, it is very crucial, not only to the survival of the people, but also to the government and the state which it represents.

For the purpose of creating and maintaining internal peace and security, the Police, the Immigration Service, Customs and Excise, Civil Defence, Federal Road Safety Corps and other para-military institutions are created. However, when laws and processes for maintaining internal peace and security are breached, the courts are there to interpret the law, ensure adjudication and the restoration of peace and internal security.

II. Migration, Ethnic Relations And Internal Security: An Exploratory Analysis

An avalanche of literature exists both on migration and on security. However, few have endeavored to link the two in a coherent manner (Klein Schimidt, 2006:9-10; Guild and Selm, 2005:1-2, cited in Stivachtis, 2008:1). In spite of this, migration issues lie at the heart of security concerns because individuals, families and sometimes, whole communities are involved as migrants, who aim at settling in environments inhabited by people whose values, morals and culture may vary significantly from theirs. In such situations, culture-shock may result, with the host community viewing migrant communities as posing security threats to their state and, or society.

Migration is one of the inescapable realities of modern life, for several reasons. People migrate in search of economic well-being as they seek for greener pastures. Also, conflicts, wars and unrests have displaced a lot of people from their places of origin and abode to different parts of Africa, where they try to settle down to a new life. Included here are refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced person (IDPs), returnees, etc.

Occupational migration is yet another reason why people move from place as they attempt to market their skills and capabilities for better incomes and conditions of service in an increasingly competitive global market. Other reasons for migration, according to Ladan (2012:10-19), include geographical proximity, cultural affinities, impact of environmental and climatic changes, religious affinity, education and religious propagation. For Stivatchis (2008:5-7), these can be broadly divided into voluntary and forced migrations.

As researchers have studied these developments and the socio-economic, political and security consequences that they throw up, there has developed the question of how to under-study, understand, and explain the impacts of migration on internal security.

The issues of migration, security and implicitly, identity, which this paper interrogates in the Nigerian context, are subjective to a large extent. Thus, an epistemological approach to studying them must offer an opportunity to separate the objective from the subjective, and if possible, bridge the gap between the two extremes in order to present us with a balanced and dynamic understanding of the subject-matter. The Comprehensive Security Approach of the Copenhagen School as presented by Buzan and Waever (1998), Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre (1993) and Buzan (1991, cited in Stivachtis, 2008:2) appears suitable for this purpose. This approach is based on the Structural Realist Framework of the English School of International Relations.

The structural realist framework provides a link between the "objective" approaches of realism and neo-realism on the one hand, and the "subjective" interpretations that social constructivism and postmodernism gives to the dynamics of migration and security, on the other. While structural realism "objectively" views "the logic of anarchy" in different ways, at different levels of analysis and in the different security sectors, social construction and post modernism imbues actions and relations between migrant and host communities with meanings, some of which may not promote healthy relations (Stivachtis, 2008:2).

The Comprehensive Security Approach blends these frameworks and argues that the security calculus includes military, regime and structural security (Choucri, 2002:100). The approach is close to Sen's (1999) conception of human security, with which he attempted to capture the diverse requirements and manifestations of development, including development as freedom or security that people should have to choose the kinds of life they want to live.

The Nigerian state is a polyglot, being made up of a large number of ethnic nationalities. There are varying estimates of the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria. While Alubo (2006:1) puts it at "over 370", the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International–IDEA) (2000:90) puts the number of ethnic formations in Nigeria "about 374".

Therefore, the need to examine ethnic identity in relation to migration and internal security cannot be over-emphasized in view of experiences of hostile ethnic relations in the country (Alubo, 2006).

As Jenkins (1996:3) argues, identity implies sameness and difference at the same time. It is the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes which are given priority over other sources of meaning. Thus, a plurality of identities becomes a source of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and social action (Giddens, 1991, cited in Stivachtis, 2008:7).

For Castells (2004:8), the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships. Some power relationships can create a legitimizing identity (Anderson, 1983), a resistance identity (Calhoun, 1994) or a project identity (Stivachus, 2008), depending on which side of the power divide the migrants or their community belongs. While a legitimizing identity rationalizes its dominance over other identities, a resistance identity advances reasons why it would not succumb to domination while a project identity seeks recognition within the socio-economic and political landscapes that are jointly occupied with others.

Ethnic identity is an important source of meaning, social recognition and discrimination in many societies (Stivachtis, 2008:9). The consequences of this can be very serious in societies, like Nigeria, where the rate of internal migration is very high and the lines of ethnic divisions are sharp, being drawn as they are along cultural, religious, geographical and to a certain extent, along the lines of Western education and civilization.

In the specific case of migration and security in Nigeria, the above-mentioned point is germane when one defines security as the capacity of the government to protect the political and national identities of the state, since a state can be threatened both from within and outside. According to Buzan (1991:47), social-political cohesion is a critical aspect of national security, and states differ (Calhoun, 1994) from one another in terms of this. For him, the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak states is a good analytical tool for assessing the security threats facing states.

Thus, an ethnically heterogeneous state would be characterized as 'weak' while states that are ethnically homogenous are supposed to be 'strong'. He also characterizes weak states as having societies not well suited to the demands of complex socio-economic and political relations. However, Buzan conceptualizes 'weak' and 'strong' powers differently, arguing that military and economic capabilities (not potentials) are the common denominators of power. In these senses, Nigeria would simultaneously be a 'weak' state and a weak' power, with potentialities yet to be transformed to capabilities.

Another determinant factor in migration and internal security in Nigeria is the question of collective identity and how the Nigerian state deals with it. As Stivatchis (2008:3) argues, "an ethnically homogenous society may place a higher value on preserving its political and cultural identity than does a heterogeneous society". Because the Nigerian State has not properly mediated ethnic relations in the country, for which reason the state is seen as an ineffective instrument in the protection of ethnic identities and interests, ethnic nationalities attempt to protect their interests regardless of whether the interests of other groups are affected. This is one reason for the proliferation of ethnic and religious militias (nicknamed 'terrorists') in Nigeria.

Finally, migration and internal security is determined by cultural norms that determine who can be admitted to a community, what rights and privileges the migrant individual or community can enjoy and whether the migrants should be regarded as potential citizens (that is, 'one of us') in the ethnic sense or as security threats. Indeed, it has been argued that:

the more a migrant community seeks to integrate itself into the society of the host … and the more it attempts to adapt to the ways of life of that society, the less threatening this migrant community is perceived to be. (Conversely,) the less a migrant community seeks to integrate itself into the host society and the less respect it displays for the values and norms of that society, the more threatening this migrant community is perceived to be (to the culture, interests and security of the host community).

(Stivatchis, 2008:4 (parentheses mine, for emphasis).

III. History Of Yoruba-Migrant Hausa/Fulani Relations In Ekiti State, Nigeria

Ekiti is one of the major states in South-West Nigeria that is inhabited mainly by Yoruba speaking peoples. The people, who are mostly farmers due to regular rainfall and lush vegetation, also love education and are friendly to strangers, including those of different socio-cultural and religious backgrounds such as the Hausa-Fulani peoples who hail mostly from Northern Nigeria. Ekiti is particularly attractive to Hausa/Fulanis because the northern part of the state shares some vegetation features of the savannah with states in central Nigeria. Also, Yorubas generally love festivities and celebrations which make cattle marketing a lucrative business in the area.

The Hausa Fulani, being mostly an itinerant people because of their traditional pastoralist backgrounds, are very many in South West Nigeria as they migrate from place to place in search of greener pastures and markets for their cattle. Other reasons for their increasing presence in the South-West and Ekiti in particular, include the entrepreneurial spirit of the average Hausa/Fulani as they move about selling articles of trade like farm produce from the North, textile materials, as well as art and craft materials from the Hausa-Fulani culture.

Another reason for the growing increase of the Hausa Fulani population in the South West is the growing level of personal and communal insecurity in Northern Nigeria due to ethnic crises and terrorist activities. In such instances, some of them simply migrate with their kith and kin and offer their labour for sale in well and pit digging, hewing of wood, fetching of water, cobbling services etc. These features and factors

make the state and other states in the South West a major destination for Hausa/Fulani pastoralists or herdsmen and their flock.

By and large, Ekiti people have sought to establish and strengthen peaceful relations with its settler Hausa-Fulani community both in the remote and immediate past. For example, they have been allowed to settle in different locations in the state, establishing cattle settlements popularly called 'Gaa'. Also, exclusive markets have been established for Hausa-Fulani trade in farm produce from the North in different parts of the state, particularly in Ado-Ekiti, the state capital and some popular local government headquarters. These are widely known as 'shasha' markets.

Ekiti people have been very receptive and eager not only to accommodate the Hausa/Fulani, but also to accord them privileges enjoyed by indigenes. For example, the government and people of Ekiti relate well with its settler Hausa/Fulani population by recognizing the Hausa/Fulani leadership in the state. In fact, it is on record that a Fulani National Youth Corps member who became a lecturer in the state university, blended so much with the people that he was installed the 'Otunba' (meaning high chief) of one of the communities in the state, a chieftaincy title that made him a very close adviser to the 'Oba' (i.e. the king) of the town.

Also, as a testimony to the accommodating nature of Ekiti people, it is on record that a political aspirant from the minority Igbira settler community had won a councillorship election in Irasa, a surburb of Ado-Ekiti, the state capital during the stillborn Third Republic *(Source: Focus group interviews conducted by the researcher in three Igbira minority farming settlements in Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states, March 2012).* In spite of the above, there are still disruptions, and security threats to the host communities in Yoruba-migrant Hausa/Fulani relations in Ekiti State.

IV.   Sources Of Insecurity In Yoruba-Migrant Hausa/Fulani Relations In Ekiti State

One of the major sources of insecurity in Yoruba-migrant Hausa/Fulani relations in Ekiti State is the growing rate of highway robberies by cattle rearers that have now become common place on the one peaceful Ekiti roads. Eyewitness accounts by victims and survivors of such attacks (that have claimed many lives) indicate that they are perpetrated by Hausa/Fulani cattle rearers who are easily identifiable by their physical features and language. The mode of operation is to emerge from the bush, carry out such attacks on innocent travelers using guns, matchets and locally made arrows. Thereafter, they retreat into the bush before the arrival of law-enforcement agents *(Source: Interview with victims/survivors of robberies by Hausa/Fulani herdsmen along Afao-Igbemo road and along Ado-Iyin Ekiti road, 2011-2012)).* Most often, the assailants do this with impunity as law enforcement officers rarely catch up with them.

Another dimension to this calculus of insecurity in Yoruba-migrant Hausa/Fulani relations in the state is that some natives own the cattle that Hausa/Fulanis pasture on the basis of agreement between the parties. However, these native entrepreneurs are unable to control their hirelings who, therefore, engage in different forms of criminal activities.

Due to the failure of security agencies to bring the situation under control, the youth in these communities have, on several occasions, launched reprisal attacks on the abodes ('Gaa') of the cattle rearers, sacking their settlements and destroying their property. Such attacks have also occurred at different periods along major highways in the state, including Ikere-Ise road, Ikole-Oye road, Ijan-Iluomoba road, etc. *(Sources: Accounts of the experiences of several victims of robberies by Hausa-Fulani cattle rearers and youth organizations in some affected communities(2011-2012).* These developments portend dangers of ethnic and religious conflicts, since the Hausa/Fulani cattle rearers are mostly of the Islamic faith.

Another source of insecurity in Yoruba-migrant Hausa/Fulani relations is the usual attempts by the latter to flout the rules and norms by which their host communities operate. This manifests in the struggle for use and sharing of means of survival and economic sustenance, such as water resources and farmlands, among others. Conflicts often erupt when cattle rearers allow their animals to graze on cultivated farmlands, destroying crops and defecating to pollute family and communal sources of water. Several cases have been recorded of Hausa/Fulani cattle rearers stabbing owners and users of such resources when they challenge the cattle rearers over such acts. Many of such cases that are handled by government are often inconclusive due to the problem of corruption.

When migrants or settlers flout the norms or rules by which their host community functions, the hosts will inevitably see the settlers as threats to their survival and security. A conflict of serious magnitude erupted in the last quarter of the year 2012 in Ado-Ekiti, the state capital between Hausas and Yorubas over the refusal of an Hausa motorcycle transport operator (a.k.a. 'Okada' rider) to pay the daily operation fee (by taking a ticket) of the Motorcycle Transport Association. The crisis went out of hand as weapons were freely used between indigenes and the Hausa settlers. Eventually, people were wounded on both sides and properties worth millions of Naira were torched before the situation was brought under control by security and law enforcement agencies *(Source: Eye-witness accounts of the conflict).* At the end, ethnic relations became tensed in the state, particularly between Hausa/Fulani and the host Yoruba community.

V. Key Issues In Migration-Induced Insecurity Problems In Nigeria

The above challenges posed by migration to internal security in Ekiti state suggests that governments, migrant and host communities have responsibilities towards ensuring internal security by addressing the sources of conflicts and ensuring peaceful relations between migrants and host communities in Nigeria. Before this, however, an analysis of the fundamental issues related to internal security resulting from migrant-host community relations are in order.

First, Nigeria lacks an approved migration policy that can set standards of the rights, privileges and obligations of migrants or settlers and host communities. Also, government at all levels lack reliable data on migrants, internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees that can be useful for purposes of planning, with a view to making provisions for assisting such people when the need arises.

Second, the Federal Government has not embarked on bio-data registration of Nigerians that can be used to monitor internal migration nationwide. This is necessary in order to check the tendency to criminality among migrants as they struggle for survival with members of their host communities in different parts of the country.

Third, there is an urgent need to implement the existing conflict prevention and peace-building strategies that constitute aspects of the national policy on peace and chapter two of the Nigerian constitution (Ladan, 2012:24).

Four, although internal security is not exclusively limited to the readiness of military, paramilitary and other security agencies, a sense that justice still exists must be inculcated in law-abiding citizens by equipment security and related institutions to apprehend and bring to book, perpetrators of robberies and anti-social acts, whether settlers or members of host communities. This will help reduce the incidence of people taking justice into their hands, which may worsen the already bad security situation in the country.

Five, host communities and their governments should engage the leadership of migrant/ settler communities more constructively. This will help integrate members of such communities into the norms and values of host communities, as a means of reducing friction between the two.

Six, in pursuance of the above and in view of the possibility of the clash of cultures, host communities must not assume that settlers know everything about their cultural norms but set boundaries of what is and what is not acceptable from settlers. This will be more effective if done in collaboration with leaders of settler communities.

Seven, members of host communities who engage migrants or settlers on a permanent basis (either in cattle rearing or other economic activities) should accept to bear responsibility for their conduct and actions. This will provide an additional control over the behavior of settlers/migrants.

Eight, natives who oppress settlers or migrants unjustly should be brought to book and face the consequences of their actions before the law.

Finally, the federal government must address the socio-economic and political causes of insecurity in a comprehensive manner. This will involve provision of jobs for the teeming population, and resolution of lingering ethnic/boundary/religious disputes. Also, in realization of the weak nature of the Nigerian state vis-à-vis its multi-ethnic configuration, the Federal Government, through the Ministry of Information as well as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should continue to emphasize the need for Nigerians to co-habit peacefully with people who differ from them as citizens of the same country. For this purpose, the National Youth Service Corps scheme should be strengthened rather than abrogated.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of migration on internal security, citing the Hausa/Fulani cattle rearers in Ekiti state as case study. Among other findings, the paper found that there is an intricate relationship between ethnicity, migration and internal security in multi-ethnic states like Nigeria. Also, the paper discovered that security consists not only in the formal apparati of state power but more essentially in the access that citizens have to the kinds of life they desire, whether as migrants, settlers or members of host communities.

Given that the Nigerian state is 'weak' in terms of its multi-ethnic configuration and also in terms of economic and military 'power', governments at various levels are, in the interim, encouraged to provide the legal framework that would be required to structure the relationships of migrant communities with their hosts, in order to put internal security in proper focus. Also, the leaderships of host and migrant communities are encouraged to foster closer mutual relationships to bolster internal security by preventing a further ship into ethnic confrontations and insecurity in the daily struggle for the means of livelihood and survival.

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