

What are the reasons behind the blockade on the State of Qatar by its neighboring Gulf countries and Egypt? And what are the implications of the imposed blockade now and beyond?

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Komşu Körfez ülkeleri ve Mısır tarafından Katar Devletine uygulanan abluka'nın arkasındaki nedenler nelerdir? Şimdi ve ötesinde dayatılan ablukanın etkileri nelerdir?

ÖZ

20 Mayıs 2017'de Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin(ABD) Başkanı Donald Trump Suudi Arabistan'ı ziyaret etti. Riyad'ta çok büyük bir zirve gerçekleştirerek, Kral Salman ve diğer Arap liderlerle tanışma fırsatı buldu. Trump'ın ziyareti doğrultusunda, ABD Savunma Sekreteri; Robert Gates, bazı açıklamalarda bulunarak Katar devletinin terörist İslamcılarını desteklediğini iddia etti. Sadece 3 gün sonrasında Katar Ulusal Ajansı (QNA) saldırıya uğradı ve Katar Emiri'nin adına yanlış açıklamalar yapıldı. Ayrıca, bu gelişmeler ışığında ABD'de bulunan Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri(BAE) Büyükelçisinin e-posta hesabına siber saldırı yapılarak, BAE'nin ABD'deki İsrail lobi gruplarıyla gizli bağlantıları olduğu ve Katar Devletini Ortadoğu'daki terörist grupların ana destekçisi ve sponsoru olarak gösteren projeler üzerinde çalıştıkları ifşa edildi ve sonrasında karşı taraflar arasında gerginlikler arttı. Bunun üzerine, dört ülke Mısır, Suudi Arabistan, BAE ve Bahreyn Katar'la diplomatik ilişkilerini kestiler ve sert bir ekonomik ambargo uyguladılar. Uygulanan abluka, Katar'da ve komşu ülkelerde yaşayan yerel halkların sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik yaşamları üzerinde büyük etkilere neden oldu. Öte yandan, Birleşmiş Milletler ve Güvenlik Konseyi, ablukacı ülkelere yaptırım uygulamadı ve tarafları müzakere masasına oturmaya ve diyaloga davet etti. Buna karşılık, Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'nın (ICJ) Katar lehine olmakla birlikte Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri aleyhine aldığı karar, ablukacı ülkelere karşı tek ve en önemli ilerleme olmuştur. Bu makale, ablukanın arkasındaki nedenleri ve bu tür yaptırımlardan kaynaklanan sonuçları değerlendirecektir ve söz konusu ablukanın geleceği ile ilgili tespitlerde bulunacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Katar, abluka, Türkiye

Abstract

On the 20th of May 2017, the president of the United States (U.S.) Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia to meet King Salman and other Arab leaders in a very big summit held in Riyadh. In line with Trump's visit, U.S. defense Secretary; Robert Gates gave some remarks regarding Qatar supporting terrorist Islamists. Later, just after 3 days, Qatar's National Agency (QNA) was hacked and attributed false statements to the Qatar's Emir. Also, tensions escalated after hacking the email account of the Ambassador of United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in the U.S., remarking intimate connections with the Israeli lobby groups, and working on projects to deem Qatar as the main supporter and sponsor of terrorists in the region. Accordingly, four countries Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a rigid economic embargo. The blockade has caused tremendous implications on the social, cultural, and economic lives of the locals and residents living in Qatar and the neighboring countries. On the other hand, the United Nations and the Security Council failed to impose sanctions on the blockader countries and called all sides to sit around the table and enforce dialogue. In contrast, the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against UAE in favor of Qatar was the only prevailing progress on the blockader neighboring countries. This article will evaluate the reasons behind the blockade and the implications that resulted from such sanctions, and it will also evaluate the future of this blockade.

Keywords: Qatar, Blockade, Turkey

I. INTRODUCTION

Qatar is a small-sized country located in the heart of the Gulf region (**Figure 1**).¹ Throughout decades there has been competition going on between Saudi Arabia and Iran in trying to enforce dominance and power on the other states in the Gulf Region. However, both countries avoided escalating problems and turning them into armed conflicts. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia has always implemented soft power policies and strategies in dealing with the threats and challenges coming from Iran². Also, it is significant to state that Egypt has been among the competitors as it has seen itself as the shield protector of the Arab World³.



Figure 1– Qatar’s geographic location

Qatar has always been in the position to maintain and sustain strategic relations with Iran as its leading gas field was shared with it (**Figure 2**)⁴, so accordingly, Qatar has always been precautionary and refrained from taking measures that would disturb Iran. Moreover, Qatar avoided being in this competition and conflict by trying to maintain a balance between the regional powers and to protect itself; it rephrased its foreign policy and safety principles by establishing sustainable diplomatic ties with regional and international organizations and states⁵.

¹ EveryCRSReport (2019, December 12). "Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." Everycrsreport . Retrieved from <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44533.html>

² Cordesman, Anthony H. (2014). "Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the clash within a civilization." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved from <http://csis.org/publication/saudi-arabia-iran-and-clash-within-civilization>.

³ Kamal, Mohamed (2018). "The Middle East According to Egypt." *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.thecaireview.com/essays/the-middle-east-according-to-egypt>

⁴ Al Jazeera Infographic news (2017). "Qatar-Iran ties: Sharing the world's largest gas field." *Al Jazeera Media Network*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/qatar-north-dome-iran-south-pars-glance-Ing-gas-field-170614131849685.html>

⁵ Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates (2009). 'Internal and External Security in the Arab Gulf States', *Middle East Policy*, Vol.16, No.2 ,p.39-58




Figure 2 - The world's largest shared gas field between two countries

Qatar was in the frontrunner to change and cause renaissance to the Arab News understanding with its establishment of Aljazeera News Satellite Channel. This channel was the major representative of the oppressed Arab people during the Arab spring⁶. Qatar envisaged its foreign policy and acted upon as a peacemaker mediator promoting dialogue and talks in many intra-state and inter-state conflicts⁷. In line with its policy, it took active roles in the mediation projects between countries trying to resolve disputes, such as in Afghanistan, Israeli-Palestinian, and Yemeni cases promoting peace and stability. Moreover, Qatar has always been active in social, cultural, and sports arenas. Examples of such projects would be the creation of global cultural villages and the giant museums and winning the hosting of the FIFA World Cup games of 2022. Qatar has been executing the 'soft power' in its foreign policy by exercising the power of political mediation and through the cultural and sportive initiatives and diplomacies⁸.

To strengthen Qatar's security, it signed military agreements with NATO, opened Al Udeid USA Air force base, the most extensive USA base in the Middle East (Figure 3)⁹. This base has an excellent strategic location in the Middle East as the main headquarter of military logistics in the area and is still hosting U.S. troops¹⁰. Moreover, it conducts operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and lately the USA CENTOM command in Doha stated on October 2019 that it has no intentions to relocate its base anywhere else.¹¹ Also, it signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkey and allowed it to open a military base in Doha.

⁶ Whitaker, Brian (2011). "Al-Jazeera – How Arabic news channel became a key player in global media." *The Guardian International Edition*, Guardian News & Media. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/sep/20/al-jazeera-arabic-channel-key-player>

⁷ Kamrava, Mehran (2011). "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No.4, pp. 539-556

⁸ Nye, Joseph S. (1990). 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, No.80, p.168

⁹ offiziere.ch, 2017

¹⁰ Pryce, Paul (2017). "The Cost of Cutting off Qatar", *Security Policy-Armed Forces and Media*, [Offiziere.ch.](http://offiziere.ch), Retrieved from <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=31219>

¹¹ The New Arab (2019). "CENTCOM: Pentagon says no plans to move US military base outside Qatar." *Alaraby.co.uk*. Retrieved from <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/10/1/centcom-there-is-no-plan-to-move-qatar-base>



Figure 3- Satellite view of Qatar's Al Udeid USA Air Force Base

II. THE MAINSPRING OF THE CONFLICT

Gulf nations have drifted apart with their opinions since the Arab spring in 2011¹². Two years later, UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia supported the military coup in Egypt, recognizing the Sisi as Egypt's president. However, Qatar rejected the military coup and asked for the democratic elected President Mohammed Mursi to be returned to office. In addition, the mentioned countries called their Ambassadors from Qatar in 2014, but with the mediation movements and talks to lower the tensions succeeded, and the problem was contaminated.

Since 2014, Qatar and the neighboring countries were disagreeing on many issues such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, Muslim brotherhood organizations, and especially the Qatari-Turkish relationship with Hamas. Qatar was accused that it conducted relations with political groups that pose threats to the member countries like Hamas and brotherhood. Qatar refused the accusations as it insisted that it didn't support Hamas, but supporting the people of Gaza and all the humanitarian aid and projects were all observed by Israel and the western countries. In contrast, Qatar always backed the previous government of Mubarek, Mursi, and even commander Sisi. To reinforce the Qatari views, it is evident as half of the foreign currency reserves of Egypt were Qatari money installed and remitted in the Egyptian banks, and even the gas shipment continued during the crises.

To escalate tensions, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accused Qatar that it was violating the Riyadh agreement 2013-2014. However, Qatar refused the accusations and retaliated by saying that the GCC countries didn't even use the 'dispute' mechanism, although all reports were being exchanged between countries through the General Secretariat of the GCC. Instead and unprecedentedly, they hacked the QNA, releasing fraud and vague statements on behalf of the Emir of Qatar, resulting in tensions smearing in the area.

III. CUTTING DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH QATAR AND IMPOSING A RIGID EMBARGO

Gulf countries faced major political crises when Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt have cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed an air, land, and sea embargo (Figure 4)¹³. Their main reason was the claim that Qatar was supporting and financing radical groups, but Qatar State denied all allegations against it, stressing that there were no justifications behind such accusations. Kuwait and Oman haven't joined the

¹² Colombo, S., Ulrichsen, K. C., Ghabra, S., Hamid, S., & Ragab, E. (2012). "The Gcc In The Mediterranean In Light of The Arab Spring." GMF PAPER SERIES PUBLICATION. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/mediterranean-paper-series-december-2012.pdf>

¹³ Government Communication Office (GCO) (2018). "GCC Crises", *Government Communications Office-Qatar*. Retrieved from <https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/focus/gcc-crisis/>

sanctions imposed on Qatar and instead stayed neutral, with the Kuwaitis playing an influential role as a mediator in these crises.



Figure 4– Government Communication Office Of Qatar (GCO, 2018)

IV. HACKING THE QATAR NEWS AGENCY (QNA)

The hacking of Qatar News Agency (QNA) site and the fabrication for the news in the media with tensions to destabilize Qatar and basing false allegations attributed to the Emir of Qatar Sheik Al Tamimi and unprecedented level of escalation from mass media operating from neighboring countries insulting Qatar and using a type of aggressive language that was never used before against their leadership, but yet Qatar dealt with this escalation very wisely by allowing a good pace of communication between it and the other countries as many countries were very interested contributing, mediating or resolving the issue. The endless mediation efforts and contribution of the Emir of Kuwait were evident and active in the crises.

V. REACTIONS OF QATAR STATE TO THE BLOCKADE

The unilateral and unprecedented measures taken against Qatar and the Qataris living in the neighboring countries could have resulted in the same retaliations by the Emir of Qatar, but instead, Qatar did not escalate the situation and was always calling from the beginning to sit and discuss the issue and resolve it in a transparent way laying down all the disagreed points to be discussed to the table. Moreover, many foreign ministers of other countries displayed solidarity with Qatar and believed that this issue would be resolved through mutual understanding and dialogue.

The government of the State of Qatar stressed that the developments in the region would not affect the solidarity in Qatar. Qatar faced previous crises with a firm stand, for example, the failed coup in 1996 and withdrawing ambassadors in 2014. Due to the earlier experiences, the State of Qatar adopted the strategy of self-reliance in ensuring to continue life, as usual, depending on its resources. Steps have been taken to ensure to achieve its visions despite any political pressures.

VI. DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST QATAR IN THE USA AND EUROPE

Unfortunately, Qatar was subjected to a deformation campaign in the USA and many other capitals in Europe. These campaigns were against the founding charter of the GCC and were lead and carried out by the head of the GCC states. Usually, these movements were contradicting the articles of the GCC, which urges the members to file cases and disagreements to the council for discussion. These campaigns affected marginal institutions, but the central institutions sustained excellent relations with Qatar. Although Qatar doesn't agree with everything with the United States, there were many common points that both agreed on. This was evident as throughout the blockade and crises, the USA relations stayed active and strong.

VII. REACTIONS TO THE QATARI STRATEGIC MILITARY ALLIANCES AND PROJECTS

Other GCC members observed that Qatar was moving strategically with military activities as it held a joint military exercise with the United States. Qatar emphasized that the claimed preparations were planned even before 2014. Also, the statements about Turkey from the neighboring countries were deceiving and false as the military agreement with Qatar was signed in 2010, and it was renewed in 2014, and a plan was set to be

implemented.¹⁴ Actually, some GCC members were manipulating the situation claiming that they were taking measurements against Qatar because it allowed Turkey to open a base in Doha. Turkey established two bases the first is “Tariq bin Ziyad military base”¹⁵ and the second, has been established and named after the famous Muslim commander “Khalid bin Waleed”.¹⁶

VIII. TURKISH – QATARI SOLIDARITY IS ROOTED IN HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

Turkey and Qatar have been in good relations since the 19th century. The Ottoman Turks had a presence on the Qatari soil for many decades.¹⁷ Among the GCC members, Qatar was the last country to leave the Ottoman Empire in 1914. Qatar Emir Sheikh Tamim Al Thani's great grandfather resisted and delayed the move of the British colonial powers to enter the Qatari land by seeking the support of the Ottoman power to deter the threats coming from the surrounding countries. The Ottoman Empire responded promptly to Qatar's administration and sent four Ottoman flags and planting them in different locations all over Qatar as a sign of protection and solidarity to avoid any attempts of attacking Qatar.¹⁸

IX. QATAR AND TURKEY CROSSING OUT MANY CHALLENGES

Turkey and Qatar have confronted many accusations by some Middle Eastern countries due to their support to Gaza Strip-Palestine¹⁹, which is governed by the Hamas movement that has strong links with the Muslim Brotherhood organization. On the other hand, many accused Turkey and Qatar due to their support to some military groups, whereas other countries deemed them as fundamentalist terrorist groups. Also, some of the members of the GCC interpret the Turkish agenda in the Arabian Peninsula as a “Neo-Ottoman” expansionism, and they call for collective solidarity to repel such moves. Despite such accusations and interpretations, Turkey and Qatar maintained closer relations with the commencement of the Arab Spring. They have crossed out many challenges, such as the failed July 15, 2016 coup in Turkey, the Gulf blockade crises, the pastor Andrew Brunson's court case and the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., and the latest Afrin and Peace Spring Turkish military operations.²⁰

X. Conditions Imposed By The Blockade Countries

Sarcastically the members of the GCC were emphasizing that they were open to dialogue from one point. Still, from another aspect, they wanted Qatar to meet the 13 demands they created as a precondition to resolving the conflict. In the 13 demands, the blockade countries enlisted were cutting relations with Iran, cutting all ties with terrorist organizations, closing down Al Jazeera Channel, closing down other media networks funded by Qatar, terminating the agreement that allowed the establishment of a Turkish base, handing terrorist individuals, stop involving in the domestic affairs of other states, cutting ties with all of the opposition groups in UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, financial compensations to be made due to Qatar's policies, aligning itself with the GCC and Arab countries politically, militarily, socially and economically and the final demand was to agree and comply to all of the demands in ten days²¹. Qatar stated that some demands could be negotiated, but it refused pre-acceptance; otherwise, Qatar would be giving up its sovereignty. The demands were a sharp violation of the UN Nations Resolution No-2625 that emphasized and stated clearly that all states have the right to determine their policies without the interference of other countries.

UAE and the other blockader countries, to increase the tensions in the Gulf region, emphasized to the U.S. that they are ready to host the U.S. base in Al Udeid, if ever the USA decides to move its base from Qatar. Ironically, Qatar hosted the base when others rejected hosting it, and it always maintained excellent strategic relations and working side by side with the USA on terrorism issues.

¹⁴ Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu, N. (2016). “Turkey's Intensifying partnership with Qatar and its implications for Turkish-American Relations. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 20(3), 1-11

¹⁵ Uras, Umut (2018, January 31). “No timeline set for further Turkish forces in Qatar”. *Al Jazeera* . Retrieved December 5, 2019, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/turkey-deploy-air-naval-forces-qatar-180131151537660.html>

¹⁶ “DIPLOMACY (2019, November 25). “Turkey completes construction of new military post in Qatar, Erdoğan says.” Daily Sabah. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/11/25/turkey-completes-construction-of-new-military-post-in-qatar-erdogan-says>

¹⁷ Roberts David, B. (2017, November). “*Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State.*” London: Hurst & Company, 5 : 11

¹⁸ Anscombe Frederick, F.(1997). “*The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.*” New York: Columbia University press

¹⁹ Gaza Strip is a self-governing Palestinian territory. It is a coastal strip of land along the Mediterranean Sea, bordering Egypt at the southwest and Israel to the North and east. Gaza and the West Bank are claimed by the only de jure sovereign State of Palestine.

²⁰ Cafiero, Giorgio (2019, November 1). “*Operation Peace Spring Has Further Exposed Close Turkish-Qatari Ties.*”. Lobe Log. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from <https://lobelog.com/operation-peace-spring-has-exposed-the-close-ties-between-turkey-and-qatar/>

²¹ Wintour, Patrick (2017). “Qatar was given ten days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia.” *The Guardian International Edition*, Guardian News & Media. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade>

In light of these developments, The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) said that the evolving situation in the Gulf is hindering their abilities to combat and fight against terrorism²². Qatar, on the contrary, believes that the other neighboring countries are putting obstacles in the fight against terrorism with their blockade.

XI. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ACCUSATIONS TO ALL SIDES

Qatar was part of the Saudi Lead coalition fighting the Huthis in Yemen until the Gulf Crises started. This military coalition has been accused of high human rights violations against civilians, especially children, and attacking infrastructures such as schools and hospitals. However, Qatar State never accepted such claims as it emphasized that its troops were inside Saudi Arabia fighting side by side with the Saudi military troops to defend the Saudi border. The main task of the Qatari forces was to stop any intruders such as the Huthis militants crossing the borders from the Yemeni side to the Saudi Land.

Human Rights Watch accuses the coalition members, especially the UAE forces, of funding private Yemeni militia groups to commit torture and atrocities in the country. The organization states that these groups were running secret prisons. Qatar recreated neutral regarding the accusations of the human rights watch against UAE and said that there should be enough evidence to reinforce such accusations.

XII. QATAR FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS YEMEN AND LIBYA

Qatar doesn't accept the split of Yemen into two parts as the terrorist groups will move to the North and deploy their weapons to the borders, and this will threaten stability on the borders.

On the other hand, with the provocations from UAE and Saudi Arabia, as they were the primary financial sponsors to Commander Hafter, Libya accused Qatar of sponsoring terrorism. However, Qatar never accepted such accusations and stressed and confirmed that it was against Commander Hafter, who violated all the regulations in Libya, willing to control the country by the force of arms forming illegal military groups. Qatar always supported the government that has been created in Morocco, as was the case with the other foreign countries.

XIII. THE REACTION OF THE U.N. AND QATAR'S BATTLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AGAINST UAE

The U.N. Security Council and The United Nations weren't able to come up with any resolution and weren't able to implement any sanctions against the blockader countries. The crises in the Gulf are very complicated as both sides maintain strong relations with the permanent members of the Security Council. Apart from speeches, condemnations, and advice given by the members of the Security Council, the conflict sustained its high tensions among the stakeholders of this dispute.

Despite the ineffective interference of the U.N., Qatar's battle with one of the blockader counties UAE has reached a final resolution by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court stated that the measures taken by UAE violate human rights and amount to racial discrimination. The court ruled that Qatar families expelled from UAE to return and unite themselves with their families, students were expelled from universities to go back to their studies, and Qatari investors who were affected by the blockade to be allowed to appeal in the UAE courts for their rights. Also, the ICJ ordered and stated that its orders are compulsory and have binding effects, and immediate action should be taken. However, although the ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations and countries file suitcases to other countries and apply to it for its rulings to be binding, both parties have to agree to submit to its decisions²³. This is reinforced by the sovereignty principle of the international law that no nation is superior or inferior against another and that no entity has the power to force other countries to implement the ruling as it could violate the principle of sovereignty. Due to this fact, members of the ICJ countries are not forced to accept the jurisdictions of the ICJ as it does not have the power of binding. Henceforth, states having disputes should agree mutually to submit to the court decisions²⁴.

The ruling of the ICJ was completely denied by UAE and stressed that whatever measure they have taken was minimal on ordinary Qatari citizens living in UAE. At one hand, the final ruling of the ICJ will have its psychological effect on the other blockader countries as it will force them to reevaluate and analyze the situation from a different perspective and avoid them to take a similar measure that the UAE has taken against

²² Keller, Jared (2017). "Crucial CENTCOM Base Caught In The Middle Of Qatar's Diplomatic Meltdown." Task and Purpose. Retrieved from <https://taskandpurpose.com/al-udeid-qatar-centcom-base>

²³ Ogbodo, S. Gozie (2012). "An Overview of the Challenges Facing the International Court of Justice in the 21st Century." Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law. 18 (1): 93-113.

²⁴ William, Samore (1956). "National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings". *Chicago-Kent Law Review*. 34 (3): 193-222.

the Qatari citizens living in UAE. On the other hand, Qatar can escalate the problem further by asking UAE to comply and implement the ICJ order, or it would apply and request from the UNSC to take further actions and enforce the rule.

Qatar's National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) Chairman Dr Ali bin Sumaikh Al-Marri underlined that the blockade and the severe measurements taken by UAE had affected about 13,000 people violating the 1965 (ICERD)²⁵ of which the UAE is a signatory²⁶.

XIV. IN CONCLUSION

These developments indicate that due to the tensions and challenges in the Arab World many people were being killed every day because of the terrorist crimes or terrorism carried out by states against their people; although such challenges should have unified the members of the GCC states, it was shocking and away from diplomatic norms seeing that an active member in the GCC is accused in allegations in such manner.

The implementation of the blockade by the three countries and Egypt resulted in the worst diplomatic crises ever among the GCC countries. Due to the situation, there are claims and fear that this could end up in a military confrontation. Although Qatar, at the very beginning, referred to the blockade as 'war declaration without blood', but quickly the calls for dialogue prevailed, and Qatar achieved success in sustaining it. The Qatari people and with all of their governmental and non-governmental organizations, supported the wisdom of their Emir.

This whole conflict raised a big question mark about the future of the GCC as it should have stayed coherent, and the relations of the GCC members should have been based on solidarity and cooperation. It is important to note that the Gulf people could be seen as one family as there are many family ties, unified by one language and religion, and have common tradition and culture.

Paradoxically, under the motive to strengthen and fortify the stand of the GCC security and keep it safe, there has been an arms race going on between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, especially with the latest weapon deals with the U.S. However, both sides manipulated each other and reject the fact that they are arm racing and claiming that it's done under the motive of strengthening the GCC Peninsula Shield Force, which is the military arm of the GCC.

In line with the crisis in Qatar, the established Turkish military bases in Qatar will enable Turkey to have a strong foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and sustain stability and peace to Qatar. On the other hand, the Saudi and UAE axis will continue their confrontations against Turkey's indulgence in the Arab World, as it could be seen in the latest Libyan conflict as they are supporting General Khalifa Haftar against the government of National Accord Forces that has strong links with Turkey.

With the awake of these events and crises. Qatar had to rephrase its strategic moves in its foreign policy and pave the way for opportunities to be seized by strengthening its ties with Iran, Russia, China, and Turkey. So these crises resulted in Qatar diversifying its international relations and partnerships.

However, the GCC states will realize that they have many aspects in common and that sooner or later, the conflict would be resolved and the blockade would be lifted as many signs of normalization in relations have been seen after the blockader Gulf States agreed to participate in the GCC football cup tournament in Qatar.

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²⁵ (ICERD) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965

²⁶ National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) (2017). "Qatar's New Active Diplomacy Of Human Rights". Madrid Journals. Retrieved from <https://madridjournals.com/2017/11/01/qatars-new-active-diplomacy-of-human-rights/>

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