

Developing Functional Doctrine in a Culturally Complex Environment (The Challenge for Transovrabia)

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ABSTRACT

Soviet legacy issues, including culture, greatly affect the ability of many countries across the globe, to develop functional military doctrine. After working from 1994 to 2021 with countries who either were in, or subscribed to, the Soviet military system, I witnessed much success and failure in their transition from the Soviet legacy to a more functional, less rigid and less bureaucratic system of doctrine development. I categorize these countries, which are on continents across the globe, as Transovrabian countries and include European, Asian, Middle Eastern, American continental countries. As a first-hand participant and observer and often lead in doctrine development at the Ministry, Joint Staff and Agency level, working with many of these category countries, this article addresses my experience in what did and did not work. In this article I address the issues and the challenges involved which greatly impact the development of doctrine. The overall system and the process pieces which makeup the whole starting by simply defining doctrine's origin and what drives a desired end state. What I write about below is not a copy paste for every country as each will differ in culture, capabilities, resources, wealth, motivation, will and progress. For example, there is not necessarily a funding issue in an oil rich country which falls into this category. I further explore issues and practical implications.

Key Words: Doctrine Development System, Joint Doctrine, Former Soviet Legacy Countries, Doctrine Working Group, Strategic Doctrine.

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“If we don't know what we are doing, the enemy certainly can't anticipate our future actions.” (Powell and Pressburger, 1943, 0:44:14)

The case of Transovrabia.

At the collapse of the Soviet Union, Transovrabia found herself in need for a modernized, efficient and effective system to develop their doctrine.

For contextualization, I represent the category of former Soviet countries, their satellites and others, including the Middle East and Africa, and perhaps other politically aligned countries, as the notional country of Transovrabia and her military force (TMF), which for decades, subscribed to not just Soviet military doctrine, but also the system of doctrine development in the Soviet model. I concluded from conversations with a plethora of former Soviet officers, the Soviet system of doctrine development incorporated a practice of over-classification, over-compartmentalization, over-bureaucratization, and rigidity.

“Processes are all the related activities (parts) inside the system that work together to make it function. ... Additionally, processes are a smaller part of the larger system. It's important that processes are effective at what they do so that the system can run efficiently.” (Everton, 2020).

My approach neither implies nor intends any negative insinuation toward Transovrabian countries. “We should be careful with negative stereotyping of cultures and accept their differences, moreover we have to be aware of differences within a culture, and of personal peculiarities and preferences.” (Shioshvili, 2017).

I address countries in this category, as most of the main players in the West have a robust system for the development and maintenance of contemporary doctrine. Specifically, what should the doctrine development system for Transovrabia look like? How can Transovrabia make her doctrine development system cost effective and functional?

In the case of the United States:

The Army's purpose is to deploy, fight and win our nation's wars by providing ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force."(Department of the Army, 2021)

The Army mission is vital to the Nation because it is the service capable of defeating enemy ground forces and indefinitely seizing and controlling those things an adversary prizes most – its land, its resources and its population. (Department of the Army, 2021)

The United States Army's vision is to deploy, fight, and win decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere, in a joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict, while simultaneously deterring others and maintaining its ability to conduct irregular warfare. The Army will do this through the employment of modern manned and unmanned ground combat vehicles, aircraft, sustainment systems, and weapons, coupled with robust combined arms formations and tactics based on a modern warfighting doctrine and centered on exceptional Leaders and Soldiers of unmatched lethality."(Department of the Army, 2021)

None of the above can be done without effective doctrine.

"Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort." General George H. Decker, US Army Chief of Staff, 1960-1962

But first, from where does doctrine originate?



Many countries differ in approach but in the case of the United States, identification of National Threats drives the identification and development of military doctrine. It all starts with the country's **Threat Assessment**. These are "threats are identified as part of the national security planning process and reflected in guidance documents drafted at the outset of a new administration, including the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The 18 organizations comprising the United States Intelligence Community (IC) under the DNI have a responsibility to monitor foreign and domestic threats to the United States. They report their findings to relevant executive branch officials starting with the president, and to department agencies and departments at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels, as well as to members of Congress and their staff who are deemed by the executive branch to have a "need to know..." (Brannen, 2021)

"To know your enemy, you must become your enemy."Sun Tzu(Department of The Army, 1964).

The National Security Council (NSC) is the President's principal forum for national security and foreign policy decision making with his or her senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, and the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies across federal agencies. The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. Counsel to the President and the Legal Advisor to the NSC are invited to attend every NSC meeting. (The White House, 2021).

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a report sent from the President to Congress in order to communicate the executive branch's national security vision to the legislative branch. The NSS provides discussion on proposed uses of all facets of U.S. power needed to achieve the nation's security goals. The report is obligated to include a discussion of the United States' international interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with defense capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement U.S. security plans. (Historical Office, n.d.).

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a deliverable to the Secretary of Defense briefly outlining the strategic aims of the armed services. The NMS's chief source of guidance is the National Security Strategy document. (Historical Office, n.d.).

The National Military Strategy along with the National Security Strategy feeds the Armed Forces Mission which in turn drives development of Military Doctrine which are the tools for implementing military strategy – How to Fight and How to Train.

ADP 1-01 defines Army doctrine as:

“fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” (p. GL – 1).

Joint doctrine is defined as:

“fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.”(p. GL – 2).

In short, doctrine is the foundation of how we train, fight and function. Sans effective doctrine, one must ask, how effectively is my military training, fighting and functioning? Doctrine should be what that particular military thinks is the right way to do things within the constraints of budget and will.

Essentially, doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as a part of a joint force. It is a guide, not a set of fixed rules and provides a common frame of reference to solve military problems. It also forms the basis for training and support products. Doctrine focuses on ‘*how*’ to think – not ‘*what*’ to think thereby instilling creative thinking and initiative. (FM 3-0 Army Operations, 2008)

In order to have effective doctrine, militaries must have a doctrine system in place to capture emerging, evolving doctrine to be capable effective training, operations and of defending their borders.



In the case of the United States, we transitioned over the decades from a 1976 Active Defense Doctrine, then Combined Arms, then Airland Battle, then Full Spectrum Operations to a Unified Operations Doctrine in 2011. Transovrabia may choose any of these or a hybrid. Here, I am not addressing Transovrabia’s choice of doctrine, as I cover that aspect in a separate article addressing Transovrabia’s pathway to reform. Rather I address the system of developing the doctrine chosen.

Once Transovrabia’s choice of doctrine is clear, she must develop the doctrine. Accordingly, Transovrabia Armed Forces are particularly authoritarian and top-down driven. Accordingly, one is more likely to find a weakly-developed Transovrabian version of the United States Training and Doctrine Command,

(TRADOC). In some cases, it is not deeply involved in the development of doctrine. In some cases, it lacks the proper tasking authority to make the system effective.

Establishing a doctrine development system must be championed as often not only is the Transovrabian TRADOC weakly-developed, it might not carry the same tasking authority and the doctrine system is to date, ineffective. In this concept, the champion must a very senior officer who believes reform is necessary and who holds great influence at highest levels. Without this “champion” the system will not take off. Or if it manages to take off, it will eventually collapse in on itself.

The Doctrine Development System

Joint Doctrine Development System is “The system of lead agents, Joint Staff doctrine sponsors, primary review authorities, coordinating review authorities, technical review authorities, assessment agents, evaluation agents, Joint Doctrine Planning Conferences, procedures, and the hierarchical framework designed to initiate, develop, approve, and maintain joint publications.” (JSC, 2020)

Doctrine development requires a strategic direction, systematic process, desire and commitment to the process and resources. Resources defined as “a stock or supply of money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in order to function effectively.” (JSC, 2020)

The United States has relatively unlimited amounts of all of the above. But there are countries around the world which do not. If any of the above components are missing, doctrine development becomes exponentially more difficult to achieve.

Leadership and Doctrine Development (Will and Transitions).

The Transovrabian military leadership must have the will to establish and enforce an effective doctrine development system. It is not enough to have a single CHOD ‘get it’ and make it happen as the entire system risks collapse once he moves on. Accordingly, the Champion concept must be transitional. An effective leadership system which allows for leader transition without collapsing the established doctrine development system.

Leaders at all levels must be made aware of the critical nature of doctrine. This might sound strange but there are leaders in these Transovrabian armies which do not appreciate the critical nature of doctrine. Perhaps they appreciate it but want to leave it for the next guy so it won’t affect their current performance of status quo. On one hand I can understand the sentiment. Most are underpaid and lacking a consequential retirement system. They want the quick answers on the problem or issue solving while not wanting to invest their own resources into the doctrine development system for the long term.

Subject Matter Experts (SME).

Examples of these resources are subject matter experts and branch proponents. As a rule, a one- or two-year Brigade or Battalion Commander does not want to give up any his talent base to dedicate toward the betterment of the Army as a whole at the expense of his current performance while in command. For example, the commander does not want to send away his best educated and trained US (or NATO) Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) graduate or US (NATO) Captain’s Career Course Graduate or US (NATO) Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) graduate to go off to some working group for six months to two years to work on critical doctrine. Officers returning from NATO or US schools are often put into prestigious positions such as Brigade or Battalion S3 or Executive Officer, or key staff officer at all levels.

A dedicated and sufficient number of subject matter experts is a critical aspect of efficient and timely doctrine development. The best Subject Matter Expert is the Officer (or NCO) who graduated from a career course in the source doctrine country. These service members can better understand the nuances of the doctrine. Former soviet officers, or subscribers to their system, while competent and intellectual, are trained to think differently - rote-memory vs critical and analytical thinking not to mention lacking a career exercising the concept of Mission Command and Commander’s Intent.

The proven way to fix this SME issue is through the Champion who demands the participation of these professionals in the Doctrine Working Groups as a priority, and a Human Resources Department (HR), which responds to the Champion. Additionally, a SME pre-screen of each publication to be translated can eliminate vast amounts (10-30%) of unnecessary translation from each document in the que. This equates to a tremendous saving in time and resources.

Source Country.

Transovrabia must decide a source country doctrine. In other words, will Transovrabia base their foundation doctrine on German Doctrine? British Doctrine? United States Doctrine? French Doctrine? etc... This is critically important as allowing foundation doctrine from more than one source exponentially increases the complexity and resource requirement to develop Transovrabia's doctrine. Transovrabia cannot copy-paste doctrine, as good doctrine is country, culture and equipment specific. It seldom translates directly. It must be translated and "Transovrabianized" such that the final Transovrabian product applies specifically to Transovrabia and her manning, training and equipment approach. "Real and relevant differences exist, not only between the cultures, but differences within a culture and of personal idiosyncrasies and preferences." (Shioshvili, 2017).

Transovrabianization of imported doctrine must happen as, terminology, tactics, techniques, procedures, operations, equipment, maintenance, spare parts, logistics, curriculum, processes and strategies etc. between the doctrine of the source country and Transovrabiaseldom aligns. If the equipment inventory does not align, for example, Transovrabia has motorized vehicles from three countries, then Transovrabia ends up needing to purchase maintenance and spare-parts packages from multiple countries along with the doctrine (with translators and subject matter experts) applying to every variation of motorized vehicle from each country, not to mention the training and infrastructure requirements. This again, is cost prohibitive indicating Transovrabia needs a streamlined and integrated equipment and doctrine system.

Then Transovrabia must have access to their source country doctrine. This means, in the case of the United States being the source country, a close and supportive relationship with the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). This ensures that non-classified, releasable doctrine is made available to the Transovrabians and controlled doctrine is cleared for release through the ODC's official system connected to the Combatant Command's clearance authorization office.

Translators, Stylists and Editors.

For nearly every, if not every country's doctrine involved, Transovrabia will need a language specific translator. This is an additional financial, HR and management burden. Each language involved will need its own doctrinal terms dictionary associated with the doctrine.

The translators must be recruited without the impediment and bureaucracy of security clearance delays as there is plenty of interim translation which can be completed which do not require a security clearance.

Once in the saddle, the translator must learn the terminology and build upon the established general translator dictionary maintained by a single translator as otherwise, the TMF will end up with multiple versions of the same source document followed by confusion and replication of effort. This implies the need for a dedicated doctrine translator pool.

Sending a group of books to be translated by a civilian translation agency is a waste of time. The translators cannot be outside agency civilian translators as the translator must understand and comprehend the military technical terminology within the doctrine he is translating. I experienced where "Fields of Fire: The area which a weapon or a group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given position." ⁽¹¹⁾ However, the translator translated this term as "burning wheat fields". Essentially the entire manual had to be translated from scratch by a military trained and employed translator.

Dedicated to the Task.

Transovrabia must dedicate her SMEs and translators to the system of doctrine development. The inclination and urge to pull translators off of their doctrine specific work for other, non-doctrine-development-related issues, for example to interpret for exercises and visitors, is as powerful as a Bear's instinct to honey. It just happens as a convenient and natural source to fulfill a temporary need. Meanwhile, doctrine needing years to catchup, remains in the quagmire of delay, further slowing the already plodding insufferably slow system of doctrine development.

Editors and stylists plan, coordinate, and revise material for publication and offer comments to improve the product and suggest titles and headlines, cover, photos and diagrams to include. These skills are a must for the system of doctrine development.

You get what you pay for.

Competent, quality translators become in high demand by competing employers such as government and non-government agencies as their translation skills (not to mention, interpretation skills) are, after some time, excellent. These competing agencies can and usually do pay more than the TMF for translator services. Best practices learned is to pay the translators a competing wage, or the TMF will find itself with a translator pool which has its best hired away leaving mediocrity in its place.

Other issues involving translators were that their work place was remote military locations and they were left on their own to get to and from work daily. In addition, they were required to deploy to the field at times with no clothing allowance. This resulted, at times, in translators in the field in high-heels.

So, the funding must be in place in order to attract and retain not just competent translators but also editors, and stylists. HR, empowered by the Champion, must become involved. Standing Operating Procedures and Policies must be written to aid in institutionalizing these issues.

System approach: Where to start.

Identification of requirements followed by prioritization of those requirements.

There are literally thousands of documents out there from tactical to Strategic level involving every aspect of the military and her Warfighting functions. So where do we start? My answer to that would be to start at every level. Developing a squad manual first won't help those relying on strategic doctrine. Start with Identification of requirements at each level followed by prioritization of those requirements. This can be done by a coordinating staff working out of a coordination group, established by order by the Champion.

In the case of the United States, it would be equivalent to the Joint Doctrine Planning Conference, which is a "...forum convened by the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development that meets semiannually to address and vote on project proposals; discuss key joint doctrinal and operational issues; discuss potential changes to the joint doctrine development system; keep up to date on the status of the joint publication projects and emerging publications; and keep abreast of other initiatives of interest to the members."(JSC, 2020)

The TMF coordinating staff, for militaries sans branch proponents should be down the lines of:

- **Chief of the J7** as the Coordinating Group Chief of Staff Chief of J7,
- **Coordinating Group Members:** Chiefs of J1, J2, J3, J4, J6, Chief of National Guard, Chief of Medical Department, Chief of Land Forces, Chief Training and Doctrine Command, Commandant of the Military Academy.
- Transovrabia's TRADOC ensures: a) Codification, printing and distribution of GAF Doctrines. b) Establish doctrine unified information base.
- Transovrabia's **J4 Department should be tasked to ensure** planning doctrine publication based on request.
- Transovrabia's **Log Command should be tasked to ensure** printing and publication of doctrines base on submitted list. Request translators and SMEs to working groups from NDA.

Coordinating Group should establish working groups to prioritize doctrine for development at the Tactical, Operational and Higher levels from the:

- J1 Working Group
- TMF Public Relations
- J2 Working Group
- J3 Working Group
- J4/8 Working Group
- J5/9 Working Group
- J6 Working Group
- J7 Working Group
- Medical Working Group

If Transovrabia has branch proponents, they should also sit in to make their case for which doctrine they need by branch prioritized. If Transovrabia has no branch proponents developed in their HR system, then the J7 will need to task a senior branch representative from the force to participate in the coordinating staff meetings.

The Coordinating Group will also need to request dedicated translators and subject matter experts (SMEs) to individual working groups from the office or headquarters from which they are assigned. Accordingly, the J7, as the Coordinating Group Chief of Staff will require tasking authority from the Champion in order to get meaningful orders out to the force and gain compliance. Controlling the order execution is tasked to a senior deputy to the Champion.

Branch proponents in Doctrine Development.


I have seen where a particular branch, sans a branch proponent system, took ownership of their doctrine development system for a few years and punched out ten or so of the most critical publications. This branch, sponsored by senior branch commanders, isolated the working group in a warehouse. The Working Group

included Subject Matter Experts, and translators. The Transovrabianized doctrine was then turned over the Transovrabian Army for processing through their office managing TMF editors and stylists and for publication and distribution. However, this was the exception and not the rule, and it also concluded after two years. Some Transovrabian country may not have the discipline in the system to do it by branch. In addition to career management, doctrine development is just one more example of why establishment of branch proponents are a critical aspect of personnel management in emerging Transovrabian category countries. However, an in-depth analysis of that issue that is for a different article.

Develop Doctrine MAPs for each level with color coded status boxes:

- Tactical Level including ARTEPS.
- Operational Level and Higher.

Below is illustrative only and does not indicated recommended doctrine: (Doctrine Smart Book, 2020)




These should all be categorized by a color-coded tracking system indicating:

- Placeholder for a manual not yet started in the system but in the priority group.
- Work on-going on a manual
- A certain manual in particular demand by a particular critical command. (Optional)
- Draft publication released for review.
- Final publication released post review adjustments.

An example of a potential tracking tool:

STRATEGIC LEVEL DOCTRINE											
PRIORITY NUMBER	PUBLICATION TITLE	PUBLICATION TIMELINE DEVELOPED	SME IDENTIFIED	CHAMPION ORDER SIGNED	J-7 TASKING ORDER SIGNED	WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS	TRANSLATE MANUA FROM SOURCE LANGUAGE	OFFICER PROOFING, EDITING, STYLING	FORCE REVIEW	FINAL DRAFT TO COORD GROUP	1.5 YEAR MANUAL REVIEW
1	Joint Pub X										
2	Joint Pub A										
3	Joint Pub M										

Phases of a potential Doctrine Development System:



J7 Tasking Authority.

It is critical the J7 has tasking authority established by order of the Champion in order to create effective working groups for doctrine development. His tasking authority should cover the tasking of commands for Subject Matter Experts, Translators, Facilities, Hardware and Software and establishment of a tracking system through publication to the force, review by the force, feedback by the force and revision by a future working group.

Dedicated infrastructure and equipment.

Working environment matters. Functional, well-lit infrastructure with SME and translators working in close coordination is critical to producing a quality product in a reasonable time. Equipment should include computers, printers, printing paper, ink cartridges, chairs, tables, temperature-controlled room as no one ever sat in a sweltering classroom and maximized the intellectual opportunity. One may smile when reading that last sentence, until one is in Transovrabia and the working groups lack all or some of the above in a chronic fashion.

Effective publication and distribution effort.

The working group draft product must be published and distributed. This implies a distribution system defining the method of distribution and the target of the distribution including the electronic version and the number of hard copies per specific command (including the school house) and command level. An effective soft copy technique is via an intranet. Transovrabia should have a secure doctrine website accessible for deployed units and service members providing access to all Transovrabian doctrine and specifically, newly published doctrine in distribution mode.

The initial distribution of a new product from a doctrine working group must come with a suspense and method for comment and revision. These comments are channeled back to a specific office, perhaps J7, for tracking returning comments to specific working groups for inclusion in revision.

The Defense Department’s J-7 Doctrine Intranet is the Center of gravity for all things doctrine and can include sub-folders such as:

- Lessons Learned: J7 Lessons learned Section inputs to doctrine here.
- Draft Publications with suspense’s.
- Final Publications.
- Updates to the Doctrine Development System: Information the J7 wants to get out to all concerning doctrine development including upcoming Coordinating Staff meetings (which approve doctrine priorities/issue orders) new orders, status of development, updates to the MAP, timelines, new SMEs etc....
- Doctrine needing 1.5-year reviews with orders.
- Sub-folders for each Working Group: Priorities and status of each with name/ phone / email of SME and lead translator. Suspense on each publication.

Force accessibility

TMF must have access to the source country doctrine which is often not-releasable. There are several ways to legally and ethically work around this issue. The first is to do an open-source online search as unfortunately, much ‘controlled’ doctrine is printed online. The second is to get the source doctrine from a Transovrabian officer or NCO who attended the source country school and he was issued the manual to keep. The third is to request the doctrine through the source-country military representative in Transovrabia who then requests it via his embassy system. In the case of the United States, it is the Office of Defense Cooperation working out of the US Embassy who in turn seeks proper clearance for release of the doctrine from the appropriate office in the appropriate Combatant Command.


Revision efforts.

The requirement is for members of a command to comment on the accuracy, functionality and applicability of the draft doctrine and for those comments to be collated and returned to the J7 for channeling to the appropriate working group for future working group in the event the publishing working group was disbanded upon publication. Cooperation may need the Champion’s influence. Then the appropriate revisions must be made to the doctrine followed by publication and distribution of the final version to the force. All of this must be in the initial timeline of doctrine development of that particular manual.


A culture of non-attribution encouraging feedback on published doctrine.

Cooperation may need the Champion’s influence and a good technique is a commander’s conference on the issue. Good leadership will encourage comprehensive and critical feedback.

The Lessons Learned Center plays a critical role as indicated below.



Holistic Doctrine System (From Units to Call to the School House). Into the School House and out to the force.



In conclusion, Transovrabian leadership must provide the strategic direction for the way ahead in doctrine production and implementing their system. The above is only meant to serve as a guide. The strategy must be in place and the Champion must be assigned and this must be institutionalized such that it is transitional, meaning the system survives transitions of leadership. In order to be taken seriously, Transovrabia must be based on a foundation of credible doctrine driving all it does.

Only through addressing the issues in this paper will Transovrabia be enabled to produce tailored doctrine regarding her wartime mission.

Limitations or resources will drive the pace of force right-sizing to fight the doctrine decided on by the TMF leadership. The TMF must first focus on what the analysis indicates is the most dangerous threat which will naturally require the TMF to remain adaptive.

Therefore the TMF doctrine development system must approach the development of their doctrine with discipline, addressing the enablers for this doctrine which is all of Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPF-I).

The “P” for the “Policy” piece here is illustrative of the challenges facing Transovrabia. Policy is a powerful rules implementation tool made by organizations to achieve their aims and goals. Many Transovrabian countries have ‘Politika’, = Policy. This ‘Politika’ is not to be confused with the West’s form of Policy, which is missing and is a key link to functionality of not just Transovrabia’s doctrine development system but their military as a whole. The West’s Policy approach is often replaced in many Transovrabian’ countries with concepts or strategies, which lack enforcement impact, or laws or regulations which are too rigid and hard to change.

Transovrabian doctrine must be designed such that the TMF can defend the territorial integrity of Transovrabia focused on de-synchronizing the threat’s operational tempo.

TMF doctrine must address the integration of governmental agencies into the war effort meaning peacetime preparedness and inclusion in schools and training exercises such that all elements of national power may be properly integrated and synchronized.

TMF Doctrine should include the further development of the TMF's Military and Civilian leaders regarding how to think, what to train on and not what to think including the melding of the Mission Command concept in all they do. This development includes strategic leadership capable of defining long-term doctrine end-states, envisioning the strategic future of the TMF in her evolving operational environment, and steering the ship through consensus building. Identify the TMF capstone doctrine for the framework of subsequent doctrine.

Joint Staff, CJCSM 5120.01B, Joint Doctrine Development Process, defines Capstone Joint Publication as: "The top joint publication in the hierarchy of joint publications that links joint doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other United States Government departments and agencies, multinational partners, and reinforces policy for command and control." (p. GL-5).

Transovrabia's military should be affordable, mobile, and lethal first and foremost for the threat against the homeland but also capable of sustainment in austere environments in deployment of support to any future coalition operation regardless of continent.

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