

Turkish Foreign Policy Under the Regime of JDP

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Abstract: Undoubtedly, Foreign Policy is comprehended as the administration plans, including the strategies, objectives, desires and tools of national policy-designers reacting to both the present and the coming time global environment of the country. As this environment is outside the purview of domestic policy-designers, the objectives engaged and the methods utilized in the external policy will normally vary from those established in domestic one (Haugom, 2006). Certainly, the contiguous ground, lake and continental basin encompassing Turkey establishes the location centrality, and historically covers the regions, where the primary root of the historical background of mankind was shaped (Aslan and Eralmac, 7).

Clearly, Turkey is a focal nation, blessed with multiple identities and an area at the core of Eurasia, (Europe and Asia). These identities grant a multidimensional external policy that tries to avert privileging one relationship over another. Turkey's associations with the states of Balkans, Central Asia, and even Middle East. Being the normal inheritor of the Ottoman Empire that brought together the Islamic world, Turkey consequently contends to turn into a Muslim regional power. For the most part, Turkey gives security and steadiness for itself as well as its neighboring areas. Turkey - somewhat ensures its very own security and steadiness by taking on an increasingly dynamic, valuable role to give orders, security and stability in its environs" (Ulgen, 5). This paper will discuss the proactive diplomacy of the External Strategy of Turkey under the administration of the Justice and Development Faction, JDP's External Policy performing the notion of Strategic Profundity, the plan of Zero Issues with adjacent states, and the position of the Arab World in The External Policy of Ankara, and its attitudes towards Arab Spring.

Keywords: JDP Party, External Policy, Strategic Depth, Zero Issues, Middle East, Arab Spring,

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I. INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

In 1970, Erbakan established The National Order Faction, which supported a coming back to religious qualities and national envision, movement, yet the faction was banned by military coup in 1971, then reappeared in 1973 as the National Salvation Faction. As a Deputy Prime Minister, Erbakan shortly served twice during the 1970s, and in 1974 (the subsequent period was during the Cyprus crisis). Despite the 1980 military coup prohibited the National Salvation Faction and imprisoned him, Erbakan established the Welfare Faction in 1982, and he appeared as a pioneer of the conservative faction. In 1995, Erbakan drove his faction to an unanticipated voting accomplishment with 21 percent of the national electorate, and in 1996, in the wake of hitting an alliance deal with another faction leader, he turned to be the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey, yet in 1997, the alliance administration had to leave by military memorandum and the Constitution Court put an end to the Welfare Faction and put a political restriction on Erbakan for disregarding the protected and standard of secularism. In short time, the Virtue Faction supplanted the Welfare Faction in 1999, accordingly, in 2000, Abdullah Gul and Recai Kutan contended for leadership of the faction in the principal parliament of the Virtue Faction.

Recai Kutan triumphed the administration of the Virtue Faction, yet this authority, rivalry was viewed as a fight between the "traditionalist" (represented by Erbakan's close aids) and the "reformist" (represented by Abdullah Gul) inside Turkish Islamism. In spite of the fact that, Abdullah Gul lost the administration competition, the conservatives soon won in the whole movement. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, (a previous mayor of Istanbul in 1994–98) appeared as a candidate for another Islamist authority, who and Mr. Gul established the Faction of Justice and Development in 2001 and gained a quick triumph in the congress votes of 2002, getting 34 percent of the Democratic vote (Yaman, 26). Accordingly, as a Turkish Premier, Recep Tayyip Erdogan served between 2003 and 2014, and then at that time, he became the twelfth Turkish president (Yuksel, 17).

During the 1980s and '90s, the expanding of Islam role in Turkish daily life, facilitates the path for Erdogan and Abdullah Gul to shape the JDP as a conservative, democratic, and non-confession party. In contrast to its predecessors, the JDP didn't focus its picture on an Islamic personality; surely, its pioneers emphasized that it was not an ideological Islamist faction and underlined that was based on democracy, not on the religious politicization. In any case, the political foundations of the faction and its authority have a portion of political undertakings of the faction (containing suggested guideline of the presentation and ad of liquor), and wearing of the head scarves by some JDP pioneers' wives—including Emine Erdoğan (wife of Recep Tayyip Erdogan) and Hayrūnnisa Gül (wife of Abdullah Gul) — implied that the JDP was seen as an Islamist Faction.

Preemptive Diplomacy

A Preemptive Diplomacy is a sort of strategy that goes to Turkey to conduct in settling all difficulties in its neighborhood and for it to grow great connections with different nations. Being one of the primary standards of external policy in the JDP period, preemptive diplomacy has been joined with the idea of preemptive diplomacy. As indicated by this last idea, Turkey desires to embrace an external policy viewpoint that intends to keep issues from happening, essentially in its nearby geographical region, or to play a main role in their troubleshooting (Balci, 5). The most practical result of this idea in external policy can be found in Turkey's craving to intervene in the Western-Iranian, Arab-Israeli, Syrian-Israeli, and Serbian-Bosnian clashes. As per this external policy principle, Turkey's scheme can be acknowledged among country states as well as among actors and gatherings in the state with respect to avoiding crises or settling existing ones. Ankara's external policy that has been sought after in the Balkans can be viewed for an instance of this (Aras, 12).

Actually, getting a multi-dimensional External Policy is one of the foreign strategy standards at the JDP time, and it is additionally the most prominent discourse and practice in Turkey's external policy paradigm. A multidimensional external strategy is thought of as the fundamental result of the activism that made Turkey a "focal country". This external policy paradigm alludes to having simultaneous and agreeable association with various worldwide actors just as moving toward various by pursuing the equivalent multi-dimensional standards (Beyza Ç. Tekin & R. Baris Tekin, 6). The paradigm became out of the conviction that Turkey could never again pursue a latent, unique-dimensional external policy depends on a solitary parameter. A multi-dimensional external policy requires building up "synchronous" associations with various external policy actors. In this sense, it doesn't see relations of Turkey with both regional and worldwide policies-makers as elective commitment; rather it thinks about them as completing and as expanding shared reliance. Inside this structure, a multi-dimensional external policy doesn't conceptualize Turkish external policy as constrained to one nation and area in terms of actors, nor it is confined to a solitary issue. It isn't right to regard and present associations with various nations as offering choices, it is likewise imperative for this way to deal with not upset the level of influence by giving more weight to one side to the detriment of others. In external policy rehearses one can see the most eminent type of this approach in Turkey's dynamic arrangement, which is never again limited to Western nations, yet covers different locales and nations (Abdulkadir Civan, Savas Genc, 104).

Bülent Aras says that in the last decades —Turkish policy-designers were planning that external strategy depends on their explanation of the universal framework and illustrating their local issues onto the external strategy doing process, yet the fresh Turkish external strategy turned out to be progressively self-assured and new arrangements are not just based on local worries of the approach producers. The JDP has adjusted another Turkish external policy by grasping political liberalism, despite the fact that it was situated in conservative's cities (the Anatolian elite) and had its origin in the Welfare Faction, an Islamist one (Kara, 69). The JDP's plan to accomplish political authenticity in the local domain, which has been joined by other external strategy, so the JDP effectively pushed through the change bundles called for by the European Union (EU), moreover, the JDP has presented multidimensional external strategies that, at the present time, Ankara will seek after. The multi-dimensional facet of the external strategy has concentrated basically on neighboring nations and districts. One element of this new external policy approach concerned relations with the East, especially the Middle East, concerns were raised about a purported "pivot move" in Turkish external strategy, this prompted a discussion regarding what degree Turkey is moving its axis by getting some distance from the West and gradually tending to the Middle East (Karacasulu, 28).

The JDP's authority - under the administration of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and Ahmet Davutoglu exhibits a renewed enthusiasm for inclusion in the Middle East's issues, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. JDP's progressive voting triumphs under Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 national vote demonstrate the degree to which this traditional modernity has been acknowledged with another feeling of Turkey's remaining in the geopolitics of the 21st century. Utilizing the Islamist discourse, this powerful approach progresses a novel sight of Turkey as assuming a decisive role as a member in a developing multi-dimensional global request. Islamism shows the convention and motivation of political thoughts in the Arab world. Turkey's thought of historical personality that is interlinked to its international strategy. Accordingly, the Ottomanism has been becoming the dominant focal point in the present-day of external policy of Turkey and its open diplomacy (Yüksel, 19).

The Adoption of the "Strategic Profundity"

The originator of the JDP's external policy idea is Ahmet Davutoglu, who is a professor of global relations, and had played the role as the Prime Minister's chief adviser, after that he became the Minister of External Affairs of Turkey since 2009 up to 2014, and from 2014 to 2016, as the Prime Minister. Davutoglu's authentic bibliography contains various papers for a wide scope of universal political issues, Islamic civilization and its point of view. However, in the focal point of his distributions remains his reasonable work "Strategic Depth" (published in 2001), in which the new procedure of Turkey's external policy is clarified (Aslan and Eralmac, 6). Extraordinarily, Davutoglu has influenced the external policy of Turkey by implanting new hypothesis, and experience into it. He presented a fresh language dependent on such standards as 'zero issues' with neighbors' and multi-dimensional external policy, and has grown Turkey's significance as a smooth strength in local and worldwide politics, so he expressed that as a nation, Turkey is at the focal point of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, the pivot of Eurasia generally and in the center of the Rim land belt passing over the Mediterranean to the Pacific (Hammoura, 7).

In practical terms, the "Strategic Profundity" idea has been utilized on its own to analyze the change in Turkish external strategy experienced in the beginning of the second millennium and to outline the theoretical facet of this fresh external strategic idea. In light of Turkey's authentic and topographical significance, the 'Strategic Profundity' idea expects that the geopolitical, geo-social and geo-financial place in Turkey in the universe has significance as far as the change of world politics and universal framework. Withdrawing from past external policy discourse, which couldn't utilize the focal points offered by the wealthy historical and geographical origins of Turkey, the 'Strategic Profundity' idea is a hypothetical framework that predominantly analyzes the social, topographical and spatial facets of external policy of Turkey. Basically, external strategy making, although, the idea of 'Strategic Profundity' alludes to the historical, social and geographical "centrality" of Turkey in the local and worldwide framework.

Davutoglu is forming the transformation of Turkish arrangement as per his "Strategic Depth" principle, which depends on an exhaustive historical-social reading of Turkey's situation in universal politics that focuses on the nation's Ottoman heritage and Islamic custom. The target of a Davutoglu's strategic plan is in this way to set up Turkey as a significant player in global diplomacy. From multiple points of view, now Turkey fits the portrayal of a territorial power. It is considered one of the irreplaceable security partners in a few interlocking regions; the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Likewise, Turkey has just accepted significant obligations, guaranteed by hard and soft power capacities, for administration and security issues in those regions. As a result of this vision is that Turkey is never again seen as a state at the periphery of the European framework or as a front state solidly established in the West. As Turkey's Western direction loses supremacy in its web of connections, the need is that its approach decisions line up with Western priorities reduces. Turkey in this manner, progressively filters its participation in the European Union and the United States of America through the prism of its territorial priorities (Ulgen, 5).

In light of Davutoglu's theory, Turkey is remarkably supplied with both (east and west) in view of its area in geographical zones of impact, especially its dominance of the Bosphorus, and its historical inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. Davutoglu stresses Neo-Ottomanism, as shown in the 'Strategic Profundity' notion, has become a huge component of Turkish external strategy. Because of this adjustment in Turkish external policy, Turkey's enlarging vital external strategy has concentrated not on the conventional union with Europe, but also with the countries of the Middle East and Africa. Since 2002, Turkey has expanded strategic commitment to the Middle East and Africa so as to grow of the boundaries of Turkish international strategy (Karakaya, 38).

Generally, international strategy's changes include two kinds of progress: strategic and tactical. Strategic change centers around the techniques and instruments of international strategy, and all things considered, is a greater amount of an alteration, alluding to an adjustment in the degree of tension or to a program alteration. Tactical change is progressively basic, for example, adjusting objectives or the country's situation in the worldwide framework. Constructivism is helpful for comprehending the procedure of alteration in external strategy, because it permits analyzing national personality building and its effect on alteration in external strategy instead of just realist worries of intensity and ability (Karacasulu, 28).

As per Martin and Altunışık, there has been a modification, alteration in Turkish external policy because Turkey's activism has stretched out in the area and become thorough. There has likewise been a program change on the grounds that instead of moving toward relations only from a security sense, the JDP administration started utilizing diplomatic negotiation and financial commitment. Objective and global direction alterations are viewed as less obvious than the initial two shifts, however, there have been moves in those factors moreover. Further, Martin and Altunışık compared the primary term of the JDP administration with its second expressing that in the second term there was a more strategy alteration (Sezal, 7).

Zero Issues with Neighboring Countries

As a matter of fact, the 'naught issues with all neighbors' has implied a double element to renew Turkish presence in the Middle East and an overall regard for the present situation. Turkey demonstrated no craving to

drastically redesign the geographical scene in the district, so, it defrosted relationships with old adversaries, kept away from open encounter and played the part of a reformer in numerous occasions. The JDP wants through the "Naught Issue with neighbors" strategy to transform the unsure security condition around Turkey's outskirts into an approach of harmony, peace, prosperity and success regardless of whether this intended to manage the most ferocious tyrants of the Middle East (Hammoura, 7).

The way to limit the existing issues with neighbors has gotten the most frequent external policy standard in the JDP period. Put in increasingly specialized terms, the naught issues strategy is a method based on the idea that "Turkey wants to develop its relationships with every one of its neighbors by saving it from the conviction that it is continually encompassed by adversaries and the protective reflex growing therefrom". In this regard, the existing issues are recognized and endeavors are made to resolve them. Normally, the idea infers the change of something negative into positive. The fundamental reason for this external policy standard is to frame a line of security and stability around Turkey. Being straightforwardly identified with different standards of external policy, the idea of naught issues with neighbors shown on six columns:

1. Equivalent protection for everyone,
2. Monetary incorporation,
3. The concurrence of various cultures in a conscious way,
4. The significant level of political cooperation,
5. The significant level of local awareness, and
6. Comprehending the connection between stability and security as well as advancement (Aslan and Eralmac, 7).

Obviously, the "Naught Problems" idea has gotten one of the most quarrelsome standards in Turkish external policy in the JDP's period. Actually, the idea of zero issue standard expects to resolve the existing issues with Turkey's neighbors and close nations; nonetheless, it has been censured for its holistic approach. The pundits think that settling issues with one nation could prompt issues with another nation, and in this manner, putting all nations under a similar category is definitely not a "practical" approach. The most frequently utilized instances of this criticism have been the disintegration of relations with Azerbaijan after Turkey began the normalization procedure with Armenia, the uneasy association with Israel and European nations in the wake of growing better communication with Iran and Syria, and the cut off connection with Syria after the civil revolution in the Middle East.

Certainly, to accomplish its 'naught issues with the neighbors' objective, Turkey deserted its old beaten external policy avenue of neutrality and started patching up its financial, political and social relations with a large portion of the neighboring nations; and initiated compromise activities and arrangements with territorial nations and entities. Also, in 2006, during the igniting of the Hezbollah- Israel fight, Turkey submitted 1,000 soldiers to the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to guarantee security and harmony on the Lebanese-Palestine outskirts (Hammoura, 2017).

Vital to graduating itself into a notable local force, Davutoglu suggests that Turkey adopt an external strategy called "Naught issue with neighbors" planned for limiting security dangers, deflecting threatening vibe towards Turkey, and opening chances for Ankara to extend its capacity and territorial spot. To accomplish this, Turkey is in need to mobilize its historical and social tools to gain passions and minds by hidden public Ottoman legacy. Plainly, the 'zero issues with neighbors' policy is a piece of the more extensive 'preemptive diplomacy' sight in which Turkey has looked for an 'order-instituting' and 'harmony keeping' role in its neighborhood. With this goal, Turkey effectively intervened - between Israel and Syria, Arab nations and Palestinian gatherings, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and Iran and the international community- for moderating contrasts in perspective, and settling territorial conflicts. These one-sided activities extensively vary from the roles Turkey had expected beforehand in Kosovo, or Afghanistan, as a participant in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as they relate to a progressively fearless, and increasingly independent external policy-making approach (Beyza Ç. Tekin & R. Baris Tekin, 7).

Turkish External Policy Treatment with The Middle East Issues

Regardless of the way, that Ankara turned its external policy course toward the West, but it is geographically a piece of the Middle East rather than to Europe. Turkey being to a great extent depending on the vitality sources scarcely understood the importance of creating associations with the Middle East after the oil crisis in 1973. Accordingly, the significance of having great relations with the Middle Eastern nations for Turkey is high, as far as tackling its issues as Kurdish issue (Khan, 34). Turkey's enthusiasm for close connections with the Middle Eastern nations has historical, topographical, social, financial, and religious grounds. The way that most individuals in the region are Muslims brought forth close social association; and common religious convictions, beyond authentic relations have made a factor in uniting people consistently together.

Since the 2000s, the JDP authorities utilized Ankara's connections with the Middle East to influence local politics. In that specific situation, advancement of financial relationships with the Middle East led to the residential objective of combining Anatolian business, which were important in the ascendancy of the JDP. In the same way, the JDP attempted to settle the local Kurdish problem by its fresh policy in Iraq, and in its second term, it at long last started to connect legitimately with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). At the end, in its subsequent term, the JDP utilized its enemy of Israeli talk and strategy to accumulate bolster locally just as to additionally ruin the military as the only backer of the Ankara- Tel Aviv arrangement during the 1990s (Altunisik and Martin, 571).

As per Hermann's model, the last kind of change is worldwide direction alteration, in which Turkey experienced that kind of change, that has gotten an area of an open discussion both locally and globally in the last two decades. During the second JDP administration (2007–11), the issue came up particularly with respect to two strategic issues. The foremost was identified after the Gaza War (2008–09), with the quick weakening of Turkish–Israeli relations. The next identified with Turkey's developing relationships with Iran and Premier, Erdogan's addresses that examined the allegations regarding the Iranian atomic program. The crisis finished in the UN Security Council vote on Iranian authorizations, where Brazil, together with Turkey, the two nations had quite recently expedited an atomic swap manage Iran, cast against the resolution. Attributable to Ankara's dangerous association with and talk about Israel and its ingratiating to Iran, from the point of view of pundits in Turkey, the EU and the USA, Turkey was moving its pivot, moving endlessly from its customary Western direction toward the Islamic world, (the East) and particularly, the Middle East. Turkey's an open contact with Hamas, relationship with Sudan, and its progressively close relations with Syria are additional problems to these three most essential issues, which increasingly made strains in its relations with the European Union and the United States of America. Generally, these alterations fortified the viewpoint that Turkey is separating from Western strategies into the Middle East.

According to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who stated that "Turkey's geopolitical situation, rich, authentic legacy, social profundity, knowledgeable youthful populace, regularly fortifying democracy, growing economy, and useful international strategy make it a crucial nation in a world changed by quick globalization." During the previous decade, Turkey has built up strong external policy, so Turkey's ongoing spotlight on the Middle East, notwithstanding, doesn't imply that Turkey is going to betray Europe. Nor is the move proof of the "crawling Islamization" of external strategy of Turkey. By the JDP external strategy, Ankara is reexploring the locale of which it has generally been a vital participant. Also, it is significant for Ankara external strategy to proceed with the vital changes that have been slowed down for as far back as two years and continue immediately to actualize its responsibilities towards the EU (Yuksel, 21).

Since 2004, as per Abdullah Gul, Turkey's job in an alteration of the Arab countries condition is a role of what it comes up to this unstable topography as the West, secular and democratic nation that is connected immovably to the standards of a free trade economy and has a significant and remarkable involvement with executing the change, regional collaboration, and modernity. Turkey's stance in the Arab countries is presently made out of turning into a local chief, model, bridge, regional defender, and an arbiter as well as taking on a liberalizing task. This fresh view for the support of worldwide politics and the new viewpoint of Ankara external strategy, during the JDP government, has impelled Ankara into the core of regional politics in the Balkan, the Middle East, and Africa (Ulgen, 5).

Turkey is seeking after an external policy that breaks from an earlier time, the alterations have been progressively strategic in nature. While Ankara's inclinations towards the European Union have diminished, it is connecting more with the Middle East. A worth based and principled approach has been more than once declared by the JDP government. Turkey wants to play an authority position in the Middle East, with two center goals in the territorial power discourse. One objective is to establish a good perspective on Turkey among the universal network and to reinforce Turkey's worldwide picture as an important regional player. The subsequent objective is to empower rapprochement between Turkey and its neighbors to create national interests. Notwithstanding, with the ease of the regional circumstance, it is hard to tell whether Turkey will arrive at its objectives (Karacasulu, 35).

Aside from its European identity, Ankara finds fresh markets with the assistance of the connections it sets up through its Muslim partners, and it finds new fields of impact and bilateral relations with the nations of these fresh markets. Global exchange is one of the main instruments of Turkish external policy. This isn't only a coincidental issue; it shapes another stage that quickens bilateral relations on a genuine political approach. Expanding shared reliance through exchange has empowered Ankara to set up increasingly expectable and stable relationships with different nations. By annulling visa with most Arab nations, Ankara's goal was to impact the culture of Arabic community, while simultaneously expanding external commerce volume (Abdulkadir Civan, Savas Genc, 103).

In 2002, came to power, The Justice and Development Faction (JDP) promising change and challenging Turkey's residential power structure with goals to rule the state bureaucracy while lessening the political impact of the military. This order for change, although additionally extended to Turkish external policy,

as confirm by early moves like Ankara's rapprochement with Syria and its opening of confluence with Hamas, the two of which were obvious takeoffs from the long-standing practices in Turkish diplomacy. These to some degree uncoordinated early advances were in the long run collapsed into a vital vision enunciated by Davutoglu, who had spent the early portion of the decade as a consultant to the Prime Minister, Erdogan before turning out to be an External Minister in May 2009. Under the JDP, Turkish external policy likewise experienced a plan alteration. Ankara principally sought after its aims, through diplomatic discussions instead of military power, concentrated on its delicate power resources, accentuated commitment and financial mutuality, and advanced intercession tasks since the 2000s. Along these lines, plainly Ankara began to utilize various ways to accomplish its external strategy destinations in the region.

The last two levels of progress are less clear and concerning objectives, there have been a few changes too. In contrast to the 1990s, the JDP approach moved to shape a more profound association with the area and plainly desired to be territorial representative. On the other hand, there have been significant progresses as far as some specific objectives. For example, Ankara kept on advancing Iraqi regional respectability, contended with Iran for territorial impact, advanced area durability and thriving, upheld the resolution of the Palestinian Question. What has changed was the means by which these issues were characterized and what sorts of strategies were created to manage these issues. At long last, there is continuity as far as goals that concern the domestic politics. The external strategy of Turkey was utilized to structure and influence local politics both during the 1990s and under the JDP's rule. During the 1990s, the strong army utilized relationships with Israel as an approach to battle with its residential adversaries, namely the political Islamists and Kurdistan Worker's Faction (PKK) and, while Syria and Iran turned out to be a piece about the meaning of dangers to the Ankara system. In 1995, the National Security Policy Document stated that the serious risk to Ankara national security is "irredentism" and "religious traditionalism" and that they are plainly connected to Iran and Syria. These risks observations, local and external plans gave a significant driving force to the foundation of security and insight participation with Israel. The army had the option to construct a "secular coalition" around these objectives (Altunisik and Martin, 571).

The External Policy of Turkey Toward Arab Spring

Actually, JDP wants Turkey to never again be a fringe and marginal nation. Rather than accepting a call boy task for enormous forces and having a constrained role of being a portion of axes, animosities and alliances, as other peripheral nations, JDP likes to play a strong role in the worldwide geopolitical game, and wants Ankara to be a focal nation with equivalent good ways from the remainder of the globe and playing a preemptive role in all regional and universal issues. This was valid up to 2011, the beginning of the "Arab Spring", when Ankara became in the altering zone and remained between domineering bourgeoisies and popular demand for enlarging the democratic field; and between harsh "secular" pro-West systems and partially religious and to a great extent democratic yearnings of the common individuals in the street. Accordingly, Davutoglu expressed that "The Arab Spring... gave us troublesome choices: We either could keep up ties with these harsh governors', or we could bolster the popular rebellions to verify fundamental fair rights. Obviously, the rebellions additionally represented a challenge to the applied establishments of our fresh external strategy [...]. Those who are following the Ankara's external strategies, nevertheless, fail to comprehend how our approach toward the Arab Spring was planned. It was through a fair thought of our international strategy standards, and an affirmation of the way that "zero issues with neighbors" appeared well and good only when it was considered related to different standards" (Hammoura, 7).

Ankara policy-designers regarded the Arab Spring an invite advancement and saw it as the Arab individuals' quest for fair administration in their separate nations, so Davutoglu said that Ankara adjusted the "zero issues" rule with our confidence in accomplishing a harmony among security and opportunity, which framed the center of our strategy toward the Arab Spring. Our principle standards, together with the "zero issues" approach [...] keep on controlling our international strategy in our neighborhood. At the point when some Arab systems overlooked such calls [peaceful and steady political transformation], we didn't spare a moment to help the individuals' genuine battle [...]. Today, the "zero issues" vision implies that we can't settle on a choice that will estrange us from the hearts and brains of our area's kin. Remember that Turkish international strategy doesn't encompass only strategies towards the Arab Spring. Ankara's smooth power is in real life with respect outcomes and recognition in the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan and others (Aras, 12).

The "Zero Problem with neighbors" approach isn't totally destroyed by the "Arab Spring". A Turkish Professor, Tarik Oğuzlu, states that it just encountered a few changes in light of the real world. It has gotten increasingly refined by considering the regularizing and compassionate viewpoints that are getting progressively present in Ankara's external policy. He calls this strategy: "Zero Issues with neighbors - form". In consistency with expanding pro-Sunni ethics in the nation, Ankara's post-Arab Spring, external policy would in general float about Sunni brotherhood. The JDP guided the country towards framing an ally of the coalition with Qatar and offering help to Sunni restriction bunches in Syria battling against an Alawite system that appreciates the support of Hezbollah (Iran's Shi'a militias in Lebanon) and Iran.

Kardas concords with Tark Oguzlu that the 'zero issues with neighbors' strategy aided alteration Ankara's local standpoint towards its neighbors. Oguzlu partitions Turkey's 'zero issues with neighbors' strategy into two adaptations, considering the Arab Spring as a divider. He contends that since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the 'zero issues with the neighbors' approach depended on a comprehending that viewed durability as an essential for territorial harmony. After the Arab Spring, the 'zero issues with the neighbors' approach developed, which is supportive of democratization in the region. He additionally noticed that a good thing about the approach is more regulated and compassionate than the past one (Aslan and Eralmac, 7).

II. CONCLUSION

In the general vote of 2002, the JDP drew an important backer from non-secular Turkish residents and became a powerful faction in Turkey. Turkey's conventional external policy has been founded on two principle columns, namely "maintaining the status-quo" and "westernism". After the Lausanne Treaty and the formation of the republic in 1923, Turkey looked to keep up the status-quo with its neighbors while settling on a moderately pro-western position in its external policy in accordance with the domestic changes. The external policy of Turkey under the JDP administration depends on —durability, win-win plan, morals over interest guideline and a preemptive way.

As JDP ruled Turkey, the new authorities had to manage, sort of issues, for example, the Cyprus issue, Iraq stalemate and financial issues. The JDP's global perspective is impacted by two components at the same time – Islam and liberalism making an amazing blend." The JDP developed out of the pro-Islamic political foundation and shaped the whole faction for the foremost stage, so it was built up with an attention on human rights and democracy esteems. "A new law was followed that would not typically be normal for a faction that was being portrayed as Islamist. This fresh enactment in regions, for example, privatization, advancement of external investment, democracy, and human rights was in accordance with both the superstructure and infrastructure of globalization." Furthermore, JDP has made reference to Islamic standards and qualities to assemble more extensive political help for democratic validity. Ankara's new external policy has been presented with harsh criticism; in spite of the expansive gratefulness it has gotten from numerous quarters. The discussion encompassing Ankara's external policy arrived at its zenith adopting the difficulties of the Syria crisis and Arab Springs specifically.

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