

Corruption Impacts on Growth and Development of the Moroccan Society

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Abstract: The interest of this paper is to examine the slowdown in economic growth because of the endemic corruption that tends to hinder private investment, reduce the quality of public investment, promote the development of an annuity Economy and paralyze the development of the whole Moroccan society.

The analysis of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on this subject shows that corruption leads to an important socio-economic cost. The prevalence of this problem may explain the poor performance of companies. by favoring certain rentier sectors, Corruption affects the optimal distribution of public expenditure. It may take the form of a tax on productive enterprise thereby discouraging investment.

Corruption is a systemic problem. Only a comprehensive approach can be effective in the fight against corruption. However, the fight against corruption begins with the political will. Policymakers should not only lead the reforms but also lead by example. A good strategy is focused on the causes and not on the effects, on healing and not only on the diagnosis, on corrupt systems and not only on the parties.

Keywords: Corruption, Growth, development, government strategy of fight against corruption.

I. Introduction

Corruption is closely linked to the notion of power. Its very definition implies the existence of power that is diverted to a private interest. However, "one should not confuse patronage or relationism and corruption. These are two quite distinct mechanisms, which require different types of analysis, even though they overlap downstream".

Corruption is the negation of good governance and the rule of law. Calling into question the equality of citizens before the law, it is a direct violation of human rights and the foundations of democracy. It undermines civic spirit and engenders a loss of trust on the part of people in their institutions and leaders. It is the source of public resources' waste, it allows the circumvention of regulations and it distorts competition rules.

In short, corruption is a major obstacle to growth and development. Corruption undermines public finances and hinders the development of national economy. It also affects the foreign and domestic investment.

Also, corruption involves huge costs. Some authors believe that corruption leads to a significant shortfall in the state. For example, "the commission paid to a corrupt official may result in an additional cost varying between 2 to 10 times the value of this commission. The loss that can be incurred for the country vary between fifty to a hundred times the amount paid to the corrupt official". Thus, a corrupt country is similar to a country that invests in "cathedrals in the desert".

In recent years, corruption is at the heart of a lively national debate on development. Many initiatives to eradicate corruption are taken by Morocco based on the recommendations of international organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Program for Development, Transparency International ... However, power holders behave like a "mafia" treating any attempt of change that could endanger their personal interests. Thus, any reform of the system faces strong opposition from supporters of this annuity.

This piece of work holds two key hypotheses:

H1. Corruption is an obstacle to Morocco's economic and social development.

H2. The government strategies, in terms of prevention and fight against corruption, are insufficient.

As part of this work, two central questions are of concern to us: **what is the relationship between corruption and low growth levels of the Moroccan economy?**

Are there efficient solutions to this widespread phenomenon?

The approach adopted in this article is exclusively qualitative. This paper has three main objectives: first, to show the importance of the phenomenon of corruption, then analyze the existing literature review on the

economic and social effects of corruption before explaining the axes of the Moroccan strategy in terms of the fight against corruption.

Section 1. Importance of the phenomenon of corruption in Morocco

Corruption leads to favoritism, nepotism or jars of wine. As several studies reveal, corruption constitute in many developing countries, including Morocco, a high tax on growth and development. According to the World Bank report, the annual amount of corrupt global transactions is generally estimated at about \$1,000 billion, which is equivalent to 20 % of the global GDP.

Paragraph 1: Causes and manifestations of corruption

"Corruption is only one of the manifestations of institutional decay. When corruption becomes the norm, it leads to system paralysis."

Being a sociological matter, it is not always easy to make a clear distinction between the cause and consequence of corruption because the act of corruption involves the "intent" component. For instance, we can say that "one cause of corruption is seeking rapid personal enrichment" but seeking personal enrichment is a target goal of the corrupt agent. That is why it is preferable to deal with the factors contributing to the emergence and development of corruption. These factors are related to several fields of economic and social life. They are listed by the international corruption research center U4 as follows:

First, a set of constraints and incentives that encourage politicians and officials to engage in corruption, including low wages paid irregularly to civil servants supporting large families. Such officials may feel the obligation to resort to corruption.

In the case of Morocco, the issue of salary does not seem relevant to explain corruption in the public sector. Officials currently receive comparable or even higher wages than those existing in the private sector. Wage arrears seem more frequent and at all levels.

Second, many opportunities for personal enrichment. Some economic environments are very favorable for the appearance of corruption; this is particularly the case of environments rich in oil and minerals. Corruption is less present in subsistence farming. The size and growth of government spending provide opportunities for corruption. It seems to be also present in the case of discretion in allocations that go beyond simple economic costs and benefits.

This factor fits perfectly the issue of public procurement. Generally, corruption will always prefer and encourage major projects, this is where the greatest flow of money could be found, thus the best opportunities for corruption. When awarding public procurement contracts, the more the discretion, the more corruption opportunities there will be. Corruption in public procurements in 2013, is an important factor in Morocco. Indeed, the new decree on public procurement adopted in 2013 does not solve the problem. The role of the National Commission of Public Order, established by decree, is only advisory. The decree does not give it the opportunity to sanction offenders. However, the only sanction that the Commission may impose on the perpetrators of false claims is their temporary or permanent exclusion from participation in public procurement. That is why clientelism/ patronage remains commonplace to clinch a deal.

Third, when corruption is a low risk activity in terms of detection and punishment. Corruption will flourish when controls (internal and external) are unsatisfactory and inefficient. A police state encourages corruption. When the media are controlled and censored, politicians and corrupt officials do not have much to fear.

According to the Canadian International Development Agency, corruption is the result of from the interaction of several factors:

First, it is necessary that people feel the need to resort corruption. This may come from the fear of seeing competitors resorting to corruption, overly complex procedures, outdated or non-transparent, and the idea of making high profits through an illicit transaction, or a combination of these three factors.

Second, the person who accepts bribes is encouraged to do so because of the unfairness of the situation (low wages, low incentives, lack of professionalism, faulty security wages) or the perspective of a reward (gains or profits).

Third, the person bribed should exercise discretion. This assumes that the accountability and the risk of being discovered and penalized are minimal.

Fourth, the organization culture within which the bribed person evolves or which incites corruption, either encourages or discourages illegal activities.

Transparency International, for its part, has identified a list of corrupt practices. It is, among other things, political corruption, for instance, donations to finance election campaigns, excessive hospitality and various other benefits received by public officials from the recipients of government contracts (university scholarships abroad for their children); fraud of all kinds, and the perspective of power used by political parties to raise revenues from international companies, especially in the form of a donation for charity, to a hospital or

an orphanage, a certain percentage pocketed by public officials on government contracts, often transferred directly to the bank accounts abroad, unnecessary trips abroad for which public officials themselves fix their compensation, often exaggerated, blackmailing by the authorities that threaten to impose a fine in case they do not receive a bribe (the bribe costing generally much less than the fine); the insistence of public officials to be paid in order to expedite proceedings for the issuance of, for instance, a driver's license, a business license or a passport control, or else the weekly or monthly payment, by the public official, of a sum of money to his superior.

Paragraph 2 : Evolution of the index of corruption in Morocco

According to recent data (2013) Transparency International, Morocco is positioned 91th out of 177 countries. It occupies the 9th place in the Arab world preceding Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Lebanon and Libya and far behind the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and Tunisia.

Table 1: Classification CPI Morocco in the Arab world in 2013

World rank	Country	Score
26	UAE	69
28	Qatar	68
57	Bahrain	48
61	Oman	47
63	Saudi Arabia	46
66	Jordan	45
69	Kuwait	43
77	Tunisia	4
91	Morocco	37
94	Djibouti	36
94	Algeria	36
114	Egypt	32
119	Mauritania	30
127	Lebanon	28
127	Comoros	28
167	Yemen	18
168	Syria	17
171	Iraq	16
172	Libya	15
174	Sudan	11
175	Somalia	08

Source: Transparency International 2013

According to Transparency's corruption index for 2013, Morocco's ranking reveals the scope of the phenomenon. Indeed, Morocco is no exception to the prevailing corruption in the country with a score of 37 out of 100, the same as that of 2012.

Another ranking, conducted by the NGO Transparency in 2008, this time out of 180 countries in the world based on the experts perception shows that Morocco has not witnessed any progress in the field of fight against corruption for over a decade.

Table 2: Ranking of the CPI over a decade.

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Ranking	45	37	-	52	70	77	78	79	72	80	89	85	80	88
Relative Ranking of 100	45	41	-	51	53	53	49	48	40	44	49	48	44	50
CPI Score	4,1	4,7	-	3,7	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,5	3,5	3,3	3,4	3,4	3,7
Number of Countries	99	90	91	102	133	145	158	163	180	180	180	178	183	176

Source: Transparency International

Even with the creation of the central anti-corruption instance in 2007, corruption is getting worse. Morocco's ranking in the field of corruption is steadily declining. It moved from the 45th position in 1999 to the 80th in 2008 to reach the 88th in 2012, a ranking which is corroborated by a perception of 79% of Moroccans believe that corruption is increasing day by day. Thus, corruption represents a "regressive" tax on households. Families spend a part of their income on bribes to have access to public services. They end up seeing this limited access due to corruption.

However, it should be noted that the corruption index is precisely based on perception, its evolution is sometimes unpredictable. A single case of corruption overhyped may increase the perception of corruption and make unnecessary background work was done on the institutions.

Also, according to the Central Authority for the Fight against Corruption, the phenomenon of corruption is a practice condoned by the citizen. Indeed, 34% of Moroccan families acknowledge having had recourse to corruption.

Paragraph 3: Corruption Perception by Moroccan companies

The integrity survey conducted by Transparency Morocco in 2001 can highlight a number of qualitative and quantitative information on the perception of corruption by Moroccan companies. This survey was conducted among 320 firms in the formal sector and 80 interviews in the informal sector.

Thus the majority of companies consider that corruption in the public sector is a major obstacle to business development in Morocco (94 %), after taxation costs (96%).

These two are often linked. Some agents present the costs of taxation as a threat in an attempt to collect bribes. We find the same pattern in the traffic police who threaten citizens to have to pay a fine that can represent almost half of the monthly salary for a basic infraction. This discrepancy between the regulations and the reality of Moroccan society can only encourage corruption.

According, the results of this survey, corruption is perceived as very important for civil servants in general and those directly dependent on the Ministry of Interior in particular. This corruption can be explained by the absence of sanction. Therefore, the survey revealed the presence of a sense of resignation about corruption that seems to be accompanied by a distrust of citizens in the judicial system in general. In fact nearly 80 % of them think that there is no reason to complain.

The World Bank survey investigating the level of perception of corruption is significant.

Table 3: Degree of perception of corruption by type of business and in time.

Types	1999	2004	2006
Small Enterprises whose (size<20)	8,89	33,33	47,82
Middle-sized Enterprises (19<size<200)	8,14	41,68	55,14
Large Companies (size <99)	8,41	52,20	61,41
Total	8,53	44,11	55,92

Source Survey: FACS 2000 ICA2000, ICA2006. World Bank

It appears, according to table 3 above, that the number of companies seeing corruption as an obstacle to their activities is increasing over time and that, whatever the size of these companies. For example, the rate of

companies that expressed this perception increased from about 9 % in 1999 to about 56 % in 2006. Similarly, it is clear that during 2006, the large companies that argue that corruption is an obstacle to their activities represent 61 % against 48% for small firms and 55 % for the medium-sized. Large firms, more than the small are the ones which perceive the most corruption as an obstacle to the development of their business.

In the same vein, Transparency International report published in 2000, by sounding the alarm bell, points to corruption as a major obstacle in the process of business development. Thus, 93% of the interviewed entrepreneurs stressed that corruption in the public sector is a major obstacle to their activities and about 80% of them mention that it is also the case in politics and inadequate public services.

Section 2: Social and economic costs of corruption

Corruption leads to inefficient economic outcomes. It affects foreign and domestic investment. Corruption "leads to a poor distribution of talent for rent-seeking activities and distorts sectorial priorities as well as technological choices."

Corruption engenders enormous transaction costs. Indeed, "the sums paid or diverted to the agents involved in the fraudulent act are trivial compared to the unnecessary expenses or additional costs incurred by the act."

1 - Corruption and growth through investment


Morocco has implemented a set of measures to facilitate the entry of direct foreign investment and improve the business climate in Morocco. These reforms include the institutional, regulatory, tax and finance fields. However, the reforms become meaningless given the prevalence of corruption in the country makes. Indeed, corruption has a negative impact on investment as revealed by the World Bank, World Development Indicators and Transparency International studies.

The review of the existing literature on the issue of investment seeks to explain the factors limiting the attractiveness of a country as an investment destination due to issues related to funding, access to land, bureaucracy, but rarely to the scourge of corruption.

1.1. Corruption and investment decision by companies

Corruption produces effects on the decision to invest. Figure 2 highlights the relationship between investment and corruption. The graph is based on the perception of Transparency International's corruption index and the corruption control index.

Figure 2: Evolution of investment and corruption in Morocco



Source: World Bank, WDI and Transparency International

From a macro-economic perspective, it seems complicated, according to this graph to find out a clear relationship between the investment rate and the level of corruption since their curves evolve almost independently. Nevertheless, at the micro-economic level, the relationship between corruption and FDI flows is real. Indeed, the ICA and FACS World Bank's survey data confirm this relationship.

Table 4: Changes in average investment companies for which corruption is an obstacle to both 2002 and 2005 by type of business (DH)

Type	Number	2002	2005	Variation (2005-2002)
Small	4	34.205,5	4.355.963	4.21.762 (+)
Middle-sized	23	18 e + 06	134 e + 06	116 e + 06 (+)
Large	49	17,25 e + 09	48,2 e + 06	-17,3 e + 09 (+)
Total	76	11,13 e + 09	33,1 e + 06	-11,1 e + 09 (+)

Source: ICA Survey-2004, ICA-2006, FACS

Table 5: Trends in average investment companies for which corruption is no longer a barrier in 2005 when it was in 2002 by company type (DH)

Type	Number	2002	2005	Variation (2005-2002)
Small	1	565.750	260.000	-305.750 (+)
Middle-sized	13	1,1 e + 06	25,2 e + 06	24,1 e + 06 (+)
Large	18	2,44 e + 06	22 e + 06	19,6 e + 06 (+)
Total	32	1,9 e + 06	22,7 e + 06	20,8 e + 06 (+)

Source: ICA Survey -2004 , ICA -2006 , FACS

According to the data of Tables 4 and 5, the companies' average total investment dropped, while considering corruption as an obstacle between 2002 and 2005. Large companies have reduced their investments, while the small and medium-sized have increased theirs.

Also, companies which no longer regard corruption as an obstacle have increased their investment in 2005 compared to 2002 when they considered corruption as a major obstacle to their activities.

A company's decision to invest generally depends on the business climate and of course the profitability of investment. However, corruption has the effect of increasing the investment cost, lowering the level of profitability of the investment and discouraging investment decision.

1.2 . Corruption and Direct Foreign Investment Flows

Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumona (2007) argue that the discouragement of private investment is due to the fact that corruption increases business costs. Simultaneously, it increases uncertainty on the expected returns to capital. Accordingly, corruption undermines growth. Wei (2000) can show the negative impact of corruption on FDI, international investments should be "tax corruption."

The main result of Asiedu study (2006) is that natural resources and major markets attract FDI, however, low inflation, good infrastructure, an educated population, a low level of corruption, political stability and a reliable judicial system are equally important.

This idea joins Michalet's claims (2002).

El Bouhadi (2011) shows that attracting FDI is not influenced by governance as defined by the synthetic indicator of the World Bank, but the finding is dependent on the level of governance in the countries of the Maghreb compared with the competing countries for FDI.

Asiedu and Freeman (2009) view that the effect of corruption on investment varies considerably among regions. For transition countries, corruption is the most important determinant of investment. In the MENA region, low investment decisions depend on poor governance.

Anoruo and Braha (2005) find that corruption hinders African economic growth directly by lowering productivity by 0.87 % and indirectly through a 4.69 % decrease in investment.

Mo (2001) concludes that the indirect impact of corruption requires more than half through its effect on political stability, more than 20% of investment and 15% by its negative impact on human capital training.

Moreover, other studies such as Mauro (1997) and Brunetti et al (1998) provide evidence of the negative effect of corruption on investment in relation to GDP .

Gyimah - Brempong et al (2006) obtained the following result: a 10% reduction of corruption increases the rate of income growth by about 1.7 % in OECD countries and Asian countries, 2.6 % in countries Latin

America and 2.8 % in African countries.

1.3. Corruption and quality of public investments:

Tanzi and Davoodi [1997] tried to identify the empirical impact of corruption on the quality of public investments. The state does not know how to offer good quality public investments and their maintenance is compromised.

Haque and Kneller (2008) believe that not only corruption increases public investment, but it also reduces its performance making the effort to stimulate economic growth inefficient.

Mauro (1998), after studying the composition of government spending, finds out that corruption is likely to reduce government spending on education.

De la Coix and Delavallade (2007) found that spending on education and health are reduced by corruption rather than by expenditure on physical capital, so there is distortion of public investment in favor of some type of expenses for which the Rent- Seeking is easier and easily concealed.

According to Gupta et al, corruption increases military spending but also the soldiers' recruitment. Additionally, according to Delavallade (2006), there is also an increase in the costs of public order services, of energy and culture compared to education and health spending.

2 . Corruption corollary of a strong cash economy

Corruption may have an impact on the companies' competitiveness. "The degree of competitiveness of the firms may have two effects that are opposed to their supply incentives for corruption." On the one hand, the most competitive companies are the most profitable; their huge benefits allow them to pay large amounts for corruption (Jellal 1998 Ades and Di Tella 1999) (Bliss and Di Tella 1997) (Svensson, 2003). On the other hand, the companies' loss of competitiveness and their need for rents encourage them to offer corruption pact to compensate for this loss of competitiveness by influencing the rules of economic activity to reduce certain costs (tax evasion) , gain a competitive advantage (entry barriers) with regard to other firms (Gauthier and Reinikka , 2001) or else public markets.

In Morocco, the annuity benefits only a small part of society which is enriched at the expense of others. In other words, annuities act as a diversion or transfer of the company's revenues to a minority already enjoying a comfortable financial situation. It thus exacerbates income inequality. Thus, in an economy threatened by rent opportunities, society becomes vulnerable to corruption. Now, nobody wants to make the effort, companies disinvest, and unemployment increases.

The rent economy continues to be subject to public protests, it is a legacy of colonialism, at which the Moroccan political-economic system excelled and perpetuated. It is particularly evident in the licensing. The most affected sectors include transportation, property and fisheries. According to Transparency International's reports, about 4000 people benefit from transport authorization and about 4/5 of pelagic are Spaniards. It is worth noting that these lists have only been published very recently following the demonstrations as part of the so-called "Arab Spring" which touched Morocco between 2010- 2011. The rent economy takes also the form of privatization, controlled and directed towards well-defined beneficiaries.

3 . Corruption and tax

The links between corruption and tax revenue mobilization are not well established. Corruption creates distortions in terms of tax revenue and its structure. Corruption does not affect in the same manner, the various components of government revenue. It modifies its structure thereof. Indeed, corruption leads to insufficient mobilization of direct and indirect taxes (VAT, IR, custom duty); which heavily affects the fiscal balance of several countries.

Ghura (1998) and Chambas (2005) hold that corruption has a negative effect on tax revenues by eroding population tax compliance. This theory has been empirically validated by the work of Megersa (2003). It showed through a study on Africa, that the loss of revenue available to the state is estimated at around 50% of the collected revenue.

Also, corruption distorts the allocative role of the state as it affects the structure of public spending on programs that facilitate the collection of bribes, and white elephants, these inadequate and never completed projects will multiply (Winston, 1979).

Corruption facilitates tax evasion. Tax evasion is a consequence of the reduction of public resources. According to Virmani (1989), Hindricks and al (1999), Acconcia, Damoto and Marting (2003), tax evasion is defined as the concealment by an economic agent of the real value of legal economic transactions in order to avoid the tax burden.

In the same vein, Tanzi (1982) Sheinder (1994, 1997) Johonson and al (1997) Gilles (1999), Dreher and al (2005) showed that high tax rates encourage the development of fraudulent activities.

Corruption increases public deficits because contracts are not awarded to the lowest bidder and the

frequency of endorsements adds to the initial project costs.

4 . Corruption education, inequality and poverty

In his model, Seika (2005) supports the hypothesis that once holding a degree, the student, even the best, strives at all costs to enter the professional world, excluding for instance the realm of research or post-graduate studies, especially in African countries, because of corruption. Seika validated empirically the deterrent effect of corruption. Mo (2001) also believes that the average number of years of education is significantly lower in the most corrupt countries. Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) hold that the impact of corruption on the enrollment rate is negative: A one point increase in the corruption index reduces the enrolment rate by 5%. MOKADDEM (2010) shares the same idea: Corruption encourages academic demotivation.

Poverty, inequality and governance are inextricably linked as poverty and inequality can further weaken poor governance. How is it possible to break this vicious circle?

Kaufmann. D and Kraay. A (2002, 2005) showed that there is a governance crisis that is causing the slow growth and therefore, the maintenance of poverty. Improving governance is a prerequisite for takeoff, sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

In the same vein, Gupta et al (2002) actually confirm that corruption increases inequality in terms of income, education, but also in the distribution of land; which does not improve the situation of the poor. In addition, the growth of corruption has a negative impact on revenue growth of 20% of the poorest people.

Li et al (2000) bring bad news for the poor: the effect is even stronger when the corruption level is very high.

Gyimah-Brempong et al (2006) strongly argue that a reduction in the standard deviation of corruption respectively reduces the *Gini Coefficient* for income distribution by 0.05 points, 0.14 points, 0.25 points, and 0.33 points in the OECD, Asia, Africa, and in Latin American countries.

Swamy et al (2001) does not, however, neglect the possibility of inequality that increases corruption. You and Khagram (2005) strongly support this thesis: because the poor can in no way control the powerful, naturally, the latter abuse of their possibility, the mechanism being reinforced in democratic countries, simply because in autocratic regimes, the poor is easily oppressed, while this does not seem feasible in democratic countries. In this way, the only way for the rich to further maximize their wealth is to use corruption. It would then be a vicious circle.

Section 3. Policy of Morocco in the fight against corruption

Morocco has initiated several reforms for good governance and ethical standards in public life. These reforms were inspired in particular by the recommendations of international bodies (UN convention against corruption, the OECD's anti- corruption convention, the World Bank's strategies of governance and the fight against corruption, the International Monetary Fund, USAID,...) of the fiftieth report and proposals of civil society. The state has also put in place an action plan for the prevention and the fight against corruption.

In this section, we first present a diagnosis of all government measures to eradicate this phenomenon tends to plague the Moroccan society. Then, analyze the achievements in the field of prevention and fight against corruption.

1 . State of affairs of the reforms undertaken by the government

Prevention and the fight against corruption are placed at the heart of the strategy of the Moroccan government. Since 1998, Morocco has launched a reform aimed at modernizing the administration by adopting a "good management pact ", which took the form of a solemn call of all public officials and employees to contribute by their adherence to the common principles of good management and to create favorable conditions for a profound change in the administrative apparatus.

The second axis of the reform concerned justice. This is to empower and develop professional ethics within the framework of a program of modernization and moralization of the judiciary. For example, a major reform in this area is the creation of a mediation instance " Diwan al Madalim " in 2001; thus the development of the legal arsenal was taking place simultaneously with that of corruption.

These measures are part of a context marked by the redefinition of the role of government, administrative decentralization and advanced regionalization as well as further development of E-administration.

Also, several initiatives have been initiated within the framework of national programs, including:

- The signing in 2003 of the UN Convention on the fight against corruption and its ratification in 2007. This convention aims at promoting and strengthening the measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently; facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance for the prevention and fight against corruption [...] promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and

public property.

- The signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime , which explicitly targets corruption and laundering of the proceeds of a criminal offense.
- The establishment of a national plan for the prevention and fight against corruption in 2005. This plan included the establishment of a series of laws and decrees, regarding, among other things, public procurement, money laundering, the declaration of assets, the enforcement of sentences as well as the establishment in 2007 of a monitoring body for the prevention and fight against corruption, the ICPC. This body has broad powers to collect information, create a database, and propose measures to monitor and evaluate policies to fight against corruption.

The development of a national plan for the prevention and fight against corruption in 2010 based on the following six themes:

- i. Institution of a transparent relationship between the administration and its users;
- ii. Consolidation of integrity and merit values within the administration;
- iii. Strengthening internal control in public administrations;
- iv. Consolidation of transparency in financial management and in public procurement;
- v. Continued reform of the regulatory system;
- vi. The encouragement of partnership and cooperation among stakeholders, at national and international level.

2 . Inefficiency prevention initiatives and anti -corruption

Today, all the institutional players are expected to play an important role in the fight against corruption in Morocco: Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, mediator, general accounting office, ICPC , media , civil society, political parties and companies .

However, despite a good number of achievements such as the new constitution, the law on the protection of witnesses, or else the creation of the central anti-corruption instance, we noticed the amplification of the phenomenon of corruption. The scope of corruption is spreading to all the areas of public life.

Morocco's policy for the fight against corruption lacks a strategic dimension, and an effective anti-corruption commitment. Indeed, it is worth highlighting the absence of a strategy that defines the implementation mechanisms to moralize public life and its human and material resources. To this end, the emerging social movement of February 2011 came to stress the urgent need for Morocco to seriously display a genuine commitment to the fight against corruption.

Also, the new constitution came to emphasize the imperative of building a set of mechanisms for the moralization of public life.

In the same way, we should highlight the incompatibility of criminal and judicial system with the requirements of the fight against corruption. The Moroccan Constitution, particularly Articles 93, 94, 154 and 159, recommends as anti-corruption policies, the establishment of a link between responsibility and accountability and to entrenchment of good governance institutions.

Decay of corruption in the Moroccan public life is profound for several reasons:

First, the fight against corruption is clearly not a political priority.

It is clear that the anti-corruption struggle is not a priority for the major Moroccan political actors, neither the executive nor the political parties nor Parliament are particularly sensitive to this issue. In addition, when the governance of these institutions is analyzed in terms of transparency and accountability (ability to report), both in terms of the rules and practices, they do not appear to be exemplary.

Second, low involvement of institutions in the fight against corruption

whether justice (as regards the control of the executive and effective prosecution of corruption), authorities fight against corruption (under their actions on prevention, education and investigation), political parties (both from the point of view of their representation than that of their involvement in the anti -corruption), the police (given the results of their prosecution on corruption), the executive (considering its public sector management and action anti -corruption) and the Parliament (for its monitoring of the executive and its commitment in the fight against corruption).

Third, the laws exist ... but are poorly implemented

The involvement of Moroccan institutions in the fight against corruption is generally low. We should highlight a recurring gap between a very satisfactory overall legal or institutional framework and the mismatching practices or implementation of these rules. Thus, the prevention and the fight against corruption

can significantly improve if efforts are made to better enforce the existing rules.

Fourth, the fight against corruption in Morocco takes the form of an essentially symbolic politics. In a number of cases, the anti-corruption institutions have only investigative and relatively weak sanction powers. The ICPC has neither the power of decision, nor the power of investigation, nor that of prosecution of detected offences. Hong Kong provides the example of a country that has witnessed a dramatic drop in corruption over time. This success is partly due to the establishment of an independent anti-corruption body, with enormous powers. The limited powers of the body and its lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the government are therefore the major obstacles to the success of its mission.

Finally, the political elites are not the only responsible. It is unfair to blame the shortcomings in the fight against corruption only on Moroccan political elites. Moroccans, sometimes complacent about favoritism and various forms of arrangements, feed an ambiguous link with regard to corruption.

3 . Thoughts for the future

The background work that should be done is to cure the problem at its root. The first action to take in the future is **to raise awareness** among Moroccans about issues and solutions for the fight against corruption by introducing the topic in civic educational programs and providing a greater visibility about the work of institutions such as the central instance for the prevention and the fight against corruption (ICPC).

Second, **political parties** must finally **set the fight against corruption as a real priority**, and thus go beyond the usual business-motivated token reforms. **Civil society** at large must make more effort to help restore citizens' confidence in their institutions.

Third, encourage citizen control and **citizen participation** in the public decision. This would involve an acceleration of the implementation of the Moroccan apparatus on the right to access information.

Fourth, impose on **political parties** the obligation to publish their accounts in full and endow the ICPC with the investigation and prosecution powers.

Fifth, encourage the development of **investigative journalism** and ensure transparency of **media ownership**. Some international comparisons argued that freedom of the press is likely to reduce corruption.

Finally, another way that can be effective in combating corruption is the combination of control "from below", that is to say the supervision carried out directly by users and control "from above", that is to say the internal administrative audit. "The case of Brazil is interesting. In this country, every month, dozens of municipalities are randomly selected in a televised lottery for their accounts to be audited. The results of these audits are sent to the media and disseminated to the public. "

II. Conclusion

Corruption is spreading over all areas of public life. Regarding **the assessment of policies anti-corruption, we must emphasize** the importance of Morocco's judicial and institutional achievements. However, we must stop at some shortcomings including the lack of a strategic dimension that may establish an effective anti-corruption policy based on set objectives that can be monitored and evaluated; the lack of harmonization of the penal and judicial system with the requirements of the fight against corruption; the lack of coordination between the efforts of the various bodies in charge of inspection, control and accountability, due to their loose institutional and cooperation relations as well as the exchange of expertise and information.

The poor public governance, particularly due to the identified weaknesses with regard to the prohibition of conflicts of interest and illegal enrichment and failures both at the level of the management of human and financial resources and procurement, as well as the relations between the administration and the citizens.

The limited scope of the mechanisms of political governance that appears, both in terms of legal provisions relating to eligibility, to control of the use of public subsidies for political parties and for the financing of election campaigns, by reference to the shortcomings of parliamentary practice which does not allow the performance of the function of political control with the required efficiency.

Failure of territorial governance due to low transparency of local management, fuzzy and uncertain relationship between the elected bodies and the citizens, inadequate regulatory and control bodies, the limited scope of action of the institutions of accountability and the delays in integrating the governance of space in the overall approach to planning.

The difficulty of assessing the results of the undertaken efforts to improve the business climate and governance of private enterprises, due to the persistence of constraints on the implementation of competition, lack of regular dissemination of information on markets privatization, procurement and the granted subsidies, lack of an independent, transparent and regular system for the evaluation of any selective public intervention

and the limited scope of the trend to reduce the use of the permissions' system.

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